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It is proposed in this article to explore the legislative
history of the National Labor Relations Act' with two
purposes in mind first, that an objective basis may be
laid for a dispassionate examination of the legislation it-
self and the conduct of the Board under the law; and
second, that on the basis of such legislative history a judg-
ment may be made as to the proper position this legislation
ought to assume in an economy devoted primarily to the
expedition of national defense.
While controversies regarding the administration of
the Act have quite recently received attention in legal
periodicals,2 action by Congress on the adoption of amend-
ments to the Act, urged by the so-called Smith Committee'
and adopted by the House at the end of the 76th Session,
now appears unlikely.
But the nation is now at war. In preparation for de-
fense efforts during the past months, the impact of em-
ployer-employee relationships upon the public welfare has
* Professor of Law, Washburn College of Law, Topeka, Kansas.
149 STAT. 449 (1935). Generally also called The Wagner Act.
'E. g., Smith, The National Labor Relations Act: Abuses in Adnimnstra-
tize Procedure, (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 615 and Murdock, The National Labor
Relations Act: Should the Act be Amended? (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 633.
'A committee appointed in the House of Representatives to investigate the
Act and the Board, consisting of Representatives Smith of Virginia (Chair-
man), Murdock of Utah, Routzohn of Ohio, Healey of Massachusetts, and
Halleck of Indiana, authorized by H. R. 258, 76th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 20,
1939). For a report of the majority of the committee, see H. R. REPv. No.
1902, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
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been more and more keenly called to the attention of all the
people by recent labor disputes affecting the production
of materials vital to the national defense program. Here,
as in the analysis of the Act and the National Labor
Relations Board, the discussion has not been insulated
from the play of emotional factors invariably present in
a conflict between individuals whose views of the public
welfare as affected by labor economics are as divergent as
antithetical developments in the general social inheritance
of the disputants can make them.
It is of course clear that war time legislation regarding
labor disputes is inevitable and legislation already passed
by the House, limiting the right to strike," and proposed
',On December 3, 1941, debate was begun in the House on Rep. Vinson's
bill, to which reference is made infra, H. R. 4193. (87 Cong. Rec. 9604, 77th
Cong. 1st Sess.) Rep. Ramspeck offered an amendment providing for a cooling
off period of 60 days and non-compulsory mediation (Ibid., at 9609), and Rep.
Smith offered a substitute to the amendment (set out in full, Ibid., at 6909)
which in substance provided for a thirty day waiting period, a freezing of shop
organization in its status at the time of the passage of the bill, and prohibiting
violence and intimidation in strikes. The amendment was formerly introduced
as H. R. 6149. The House voted to substitute the Smith amendment for the
Ramspeck amendment by a vote of 182 to 143 (Ibid., at 9636) then to substi-
tute the amendment for the Vinson bill which was agreed to without objection
(Ibid.) and passed the bill as thus amended by a vote of 229 to 158 (Ibid., at
9637). A number of bills dealing with the subject had previously been intro-
duced.
Cf. E. g., S. 683, by Sen. Ball, introduced on January 31, entitled "Defense
Industry Conciliation Act of 1941", making it mandatory that defense industry
employee representatives and employers negotiate adjustment of labor problems
and conditions whenever either party gives notice of such desire. If settlement
fails, no lockout is permitted until ten days after the director of the United
States -Conciliation Service has an opportunity to bring the dispute to settlement.
The director may notify the President if he makes no progress in settling the
dispute and the President may appoint a special mediation board. See also,
H. R. 2850 and H. R. 4139, by Representative Vinson, introduced on January
29, 1941, prohibiting strikes or lockouts until after investigation and report
by Naval Defense Adjustment Board and the National Mediation Board
prohibiting the employment of Commumists and Nazis. Cf. H. R. 10707 and
H. R. 10708, 76th Cong. 3d. Sess. relating to a twenty-four hour limit in defense
strikes cited by Pressman, Sabotage and National Defenre, (1941) 54 HAsv.
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legislation for a Model Sabotage Prevention Act,' em-
embraces not only a consideration of amendatory legisla-
by previous labor legislation. The problem now presented
embraces not only a consideration of amendatory legisla-
tion to the Act to foster more amicable employer-employee
relationships under normal conditions, but also a consid-
eration of the public interest in timely and effective so-
lution of problems of labor economics in so-called de-
fense industries. As our national cisis grows more and
more acute, further examinations of the Act with a view
to restating its purpose and its scope are inevitable. And
it seems now imperative in determining the course to be
followed in the future with respect to the National Labor
Relations Act and the Board, to examine the full scope
L. REv. 632, 642. Numerous other bills concerning defense production have also
been introduced to regulate activities of labor.
On January 6, 1941, Rep. Hoffman introduced a bill (H. R. 1403) making
it unlawful to induce another to pay anything as a condition precedent to em-
ployment in the National Defense program, and on January 10, 1941, he in-
troduced a bill (H. R. 1814) making it unlawful for any -person to require
persons supplying services or materials affecting national defense to be a mem-
ber of a union or to pay any money to such organization. On March 17, 1941,
he introduced a further bill (H. R. 4040) to provide that where strikes or picket
lines interfered with the production of defense materials the Federal Bureau
of Investigation should hold an election of the striking employees to determine
whether the strike should continue; if the majority voted to discontinue the
strike, then the Army officials were to take the necessary measures to assure
employees the right to pursue their usual employment. On March 31, 1941,
Rep. Ford introduced a bill (H.R. 4223) whereby those inciting or participat-
ing in strikes against the United States in defense production units would be
held guilty of treason and punishable by 25 years imprisonment or death.
On April 7, 1941, Senator Reynolds introduced a Joint Resolution (S.J.
64) prohibiting any labor organization from having as an agent or officer any
person not a citizen, or who within the preceding two years had been a Fascist,
a Nazi, or Commumst, or who had lost his citizenship rights or was ineligible
to hold public office.
A discussion of the propriety of such legislation is set out in Labor and
NVational Defense, A compilation by the Twentieth Century Fund, at 121, ff
(lfr41).
" See Warner, The Model Sabotage Prevention Act, (1941) 54 HAR. L. Ray.
602, ff.
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and extent of the statute as revealed by the complete his-
tory of the legislative process leading to the enactment of
the law.
The legislative history of the Act will not, in itself,
prove much. But an understanding of such history with
all the complex interplay between various individuals and
groups seeking to strengthen or emasculate the Act ought
to furnish an essential ingredient in a sound basis for
determining the proper direction for proposed changes in
legislative control of employer - employee relationships.
How can Congressman Smith so completely condemn, or
Congressman Murdock so heartily endorse the conduct of
the Board under the Act unless it is first clear what Con-
gress wanted to have done and to leave undone? And
without such knowledge how can we explore the potentiali-
ties of the Act in a new crisis or ascertain the part it
ought to play in the new labor economics arising from the
exigencies of national defense, when and if a new approach
to labor problems becomes imperative? In a general exam-
ination of the entire controversy we can hardly do less
than follow the investigations of legislative intent as con-
ducted by the Supreme Court in specific matters concern-
ing the provisions of the Act and the duties of the Board.'
Since criticisms have principally been aimed at the pro-
cedural aspects of the work of the Board, it may be advis-
able to examine particularly the actual intent of Congress
as to methods to be employed in the implementation of the
Act. What Congress approved then it may not now en-
dorse; if so, amendments may be enacted. But until the
attitude of the entire legislative branch is shown to have
changed, it seems probable that the courts will ascertain
' E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., et al., 303 U.S. 261 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. The Falk
Corporation, 308 U.S. 453 (1940) ; American Federation of Labor v. National
Labor Relations Board, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
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the purpose of Congress from the materials developed
concomitant with the passage of the Act. The Board
itself ought to do no less; and commendations and criti-
cisms of the Act or the agency should be made from a
frame of reference bottomed at least in part upon an
understanding of the legislative intent.
FEDERAL LABOR LEGISLATION BEFORE THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT
Any chronicle of the history of this legislation would
be incomplete without reference to the legislation which
preceded it, for frequent reference was made during the
legislative process to analogous problems presented by stat-
utes previously enacted relating to labor. Such investiga-
tion must, of course, be here limited in extent.
Following the Pullman strike, Congress in 1888 author-
ized the President to appoint a commission to make inves-
tigations and reports in railroad strike controversies.! As
a result of the recommendations of the commission, the
so-called "Erdman Act" was passed in 1898 ' including
provisions that no employee should be forced to relinquish
his right to associate with the other employees for the
purpose of collective bargaining.9 A permanent mediation
board was created in 1913,"° and in 1916, employment of
railroad employees was limited to an eight hour day." In
1920, a bi-partisan Railroad Labor Board was created and
authorized to hold hearings and issue decisions. No power
'25 STrA, 501 (1888).
' 30 STAT. 424, Sec. 10 (1898).
"Both state and federal legislation making so-called yellow dog contracts
pumshable criminally, was later held unconstitutional, however, in Adamr v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
1038 STAT. 103 (1913).
'39 STAT. 61 (1919) amending 34 STAT. 1415 which limited employment
as a safety measure to 16 hours.
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of enforcement," however, was granted to the Board. The
later failure of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
where no effective power of enforcement existed, was fore-
shadowed in the ineffectiveness of this Act, which was
amended in 1926. Without examining the provisions of
the Railroad Labor Act of 1926's in detail, it may be noted
that the Act required recognition of the principle of col-
lective bargaining, forbade interference of either employer
or employee with the rights of the other, and provided for
voluntary arbitration between the parties. The constitu-
tionality of the Act was upheld in 1930,14 and the statute
was broadened in 1934.1'
Mr. Leiserson, formerly chairman of the National
Mediation Board, and presently a member of the National
Labor Relations Board, has characterized the provisions
of the Wagner Act as substantially similar in purpose and
effect to those of the Railway Labor Act."
The history of the National War Labor Board has
already received detailed consideration elsewhere." Briefly,
the Board seems to have arisen rather more from the
necessities of intelligent distribution of man-power through
the industries than as a policing agency to insure amicable
'41 STAT. 470 (Sec. 304 of Transportation Act (1920)).
144 STAT. 577 (1926).
"
4Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281
U.S. 548 (1930).
'48 STAT. 1185 (1934).
" VERRATIm RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HousE COmmITTEE IN-
VESTIGATING LABOR BOARD AND WAGNER ACT, p. 3, testimony of W M. Leiser-
son, on Dec. 11, 1939, hereinafter referred to as "House Hearings" Note also
that: "Congress, in enacting the National Labor Relations Act, had in mind
the experience in the administration of the Railway Labor Act, and declared that
the former was an 'amplification and further clarification of the principles' of
the latter. Report of the House Committee on Labor, H.R. 1147, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 3." National Labor Relations Bd. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., et al., 303 U. S. 261 (1938).
" Hoague, Brown, and Marcus, WartLime Conscription and Control of
Labor, (1910) 54 HAR. L. REv. 50, at 53-61.
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settlement of employer-employee disputes 8 , and the en-
abling legislation provided for the enforcement of awards
of the National War Labor Board by permitting the Fed-
eral Government to take over the industries themselves.,"
The War Labor Conference Board, predecessor of the
National War Labor Board, emphasized as one of the
policies to govern relations between workers and employers
in war industries that
The right of workers to organize in trade unions and to bargain
collectively through chosen representatives is recognized and af-
firmed
This right shall not be denied, abridged, or interfered with by the
employers in any manner whatsoever.
Employers shall not discharge workers for membership in trade
unions, nor for legitimate trade union activities.
The War Labor Conference Board further suggested
at Section 4:
The workers, in the exercise of their right to organize, shall
not use coercive measures of any kind to induce persons to join
their organizations nor to induce employers to bargain or deal there-
with.22
As hereafter appears, the legislative history of the
National Labor Relations Act makes it clear that the Act
was conceived solely for the purpose of protecting em-
ployees against employers, thereby insuring equality of
bargaining power. Nothing in the Act or in the proceed-
ings pending its adoption placed any restriction upon em-
" lbid., and see NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD (Bull. No. 387, Bur. Lab.
Stat., U. S. Dept. Lab.), at p. 32, wherein this suggestion is emphasized as a
part of the "Principles and Policies to Govern Relations between Workers and
Employers in War Industries for the Duration of the War" laid down by the
War Labor Conference Board.
" NATioNAL WAR LABOR BOARD, ibid., see letter of President Wilson, at
361ff.
2 Ibid. at p. 32.
Ibid.
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ployees in their use of "coercive measures of any kind to
induce persons to join their organizations nor to induce
employers to bargain or deal therewith." Hence, it seems
doubtful that the principles approved by the Board in 1917,
are, as suggested by Congressman Murdock, "exactly the
principles of the National Labor Relations Act."2
In 1932, the Norris-La Guardia Act 8  was passed,
which stated the policy of the government to protect the
employee in his right to bargain .collectively and further
provided that "he have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own
choosing 2,24 The Act itself limited the use of injunc-
' "At the Conference on Labor Law and Labor Legislation, J. Warren
Madden, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, who presided, told
the audience that the principles on which the War Labor Board was set up in
1917 vwere exactly the same as those on wluch the National Labor Relations
Board is based. 'It is therefore unthinkable,' he said, 'that these principles be
voided or subverted under the present drive for national defense.'" Report of
the Proceeding of the Conference, 3 NAT. LAW. G. Q. 116 (1940). Cf., also,
Rep. Miurdock, The Defense Emergency and the National Labor Relations Act,
ibid., at 86, 89.
n47 STAT. 70.
The entire section relating to the purpose of the Act is revealing on the
question of the development of Congressional consciousness of the necessity
of assistance to labor in employer-employee relationships. The section reads
as follows "In the interpretation of this Act and in determining the jurisdic-
tion and authority of the courts of the United States as such jurisdiction and
authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of the United States
is hereby declared as follows.
"Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize incorporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is
commonly helpless to exercise his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain ac-
ceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be
free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and
that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-
orgaization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definition
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tions by employers in labor disputes and made the so-called
"yellow dog" contract unenforceable in the federal courts."
THE LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
RECOVERY ACT
The first comprehensive attempt by Congress to regu-
late labor relations on behalf of all employees in businesses
throughout the country was embodied in Section 7 (a) of
the National Industrial Recovery Act.26 As has been noted
elsewhere, 7 there was substantially no discussion of the
of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the
United States are hereby enacted."
'For a further general discussion of the history of the labor legislation,
see LANDIS, CASES oF LABOR LAW, Chapter I (1934), and MAGRUDER, A Half
Centur, of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective Bargamili,
(1937) 50 Hamv. L. REv. 1071. Senator Wagner eloquently described the de-
velopment of labor law in presenting the National Labor Relations Act to
Congress. 79 CONG. REi. 7565, ff. (1935). A brief summary of labor legisla-
tion in the United States is found in Lm, LABoR LAW AND RELATIONS, Chap-
ter 1 (1938).
'48 STAT. 195 (1933). Section 7 (a) recognized the right of labor to bar-
gain collectively free from employer interference and prohibited so-called "yel-
low dog" contracts. It further provided for the establishment of wage-hour
provisions in the industrial codes to be adopted by agreement of employers
and employees if possible, but if no agreement could be had the codes were to
be imposed by order, and enforced as other codes. The entire National In-
dustrial Recovery Act was passed with almost unprecedented speed. The bill
was introduced as H.R. 5755 and referred to Representative Doughton, as chair-
man of the House Ways and Means Committee. It was favorably reported
on May 23, 1933, without substantial amendment as to the labor features of
the Act (although broadened in a minor way by the adoption of a suggested
amendment of Mr. William Green), and was debated and passed the House as
so amended on May 26, 1933. It was sent to the Senate and was favorably
reported by the Senate Committee on Finance with one amendment regarding
the labor provisions of the Act, which amendment was rejected by the Senate.
Other amendments were adopted, and the bill was sent to joint conference on
June 10, after passage by the Senate. The conference report was agreed to by
the House on June 10, and by the Senate on June 13. The bill was signed :by
the President and became law on June 16. See 77 CONG. REc. 4062, 4373, 440,
4996, 5425, 638, 5701, 5861, 6198 (1933). As to earlier history of the Bill,
see 77 CONG. REc. 3611. See also, as to history of the bill H. R. REM. No. 159.
73d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933).
" LORWIN AND LumG, LABoR RELATIONS BoARD, (1935) p. 37.
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labor provisions of the Act in the House.2" The sponsor
of the Recovery Act in the House confossed ignorance of
proposed amendments to Section 7 (a), dealing with labor
problems,"0 and the subject was not discussed in the de-
bates. Except for a limited discussion in the Senate re-
garding the status of "company unions""0 and support of
such organizations by employers,3" on a proposed amend-
ment apparently authorizing such support," there was little
debate in either branch of Congress on the labor provisions
of the Act.
' There were, however, some statements made which called the attention
of the House to the fact that Sec. 7 (a) served an independent purpose relating
to trade unionism as well as its primary purpose relating to recovery. See
LORWIN AND LUBNIG, supra note 27, at 38, and 77 CONG. Rc. 4360 (1933)
wherein the following colloquy during the House debate is related.
"Mr. Lambeth. A little while ago the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Wadsworth] said that this bill spells the end of individualism in America,
meaning, I suppose, rugged individualism. Does the gentleman from Massa-
chusetts agree with me that the kind of individualism it seeks to end is 'ragged'
individualism?
"Mr. Connery- Yes. I certainly agree with the gentleman. This bill will
end 'ragged' individualism by providing decent wages and outlawing 'yellow
dog' contracts and sweatshop conditions."
'77 CoNG. REc. 5695 (1938).
'The term "company union" is used to designate a group of employees
which is dominated or to which support is given by the employer, as dis-
tinguished from an "independent union", existing free from employer inter-
ference or domination, but not affiliated with a national labor orgamzation.
'See LoawiN & LuBNiG, supra note 27, at 3944 as to the growth of com-
pany unionism before the Recovery Act.
Cf., ibid. at 43-4. The amendment was reported favorably by the Senate
Committee as follows
"Section 7 of the bill sets forth certain conditions that must be contained
in each code of fair competition or agreement. Among these is the condition
that employees shall have the right of organization and collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing and shall be free from interfer-
ence, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor or their agents in designating
representatives or in self-orgamzation or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Your cont-
mittee has inserted a proviso in section 7 (a) indicating that it is not intended
to-compel a change in existing satisfactory relationships between employees and
employers." (Italics supplied.) SEN. REP. No. 114, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933)
2.3. The amendment was eliminated before final passages of the Act.
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It is unquestioned that the purpose of the Act was
fundamentally economic. As stated by the former chair-
man of the Labor Advisory Board of the National Re-
covery Administration,3 the Act sought, incidentally, to
eliminate undesirable trade practices, and primarily, to
stimulate consumption of all products by reducing unem-
ployment (through shortening hours) and raising the pur-
chasing power of labor (through increases in wages) "
It would appear that the only reason for the provisions of
Section 7 (a) was to make it impossible for the industrial-
ist to take advantage of the employees while the nation
followed the road to industrial recovery, conduct which
might thereby engender further disruption of the economic
system. To this end, a ceiling over hours and a floor under
wages was imperative, and such ends might best be secured
by the active participation of employee groups, unhampered
by employer domination, in conferences looking toward the
solution of industrial problems, especially those relating
' AmFcA's REcOVtRY PROGrAM (1934), contribution by Leo Wolman,
pp. 89-90.
" The Recovery Act itself set lorth the correlation between the purely
economic provisions of the Act and those relating to labor, in the manner fol-
lowing •
"Section 1. A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment
and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce,
affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the Amer-
ican people, is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy
of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign
commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the
general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of
cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain inited action. of
labor and ianagement under adequate governmental sanctions and superviston,
to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utiliza-
tion of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction
of production (except such as may be temporarily required), to increase the
consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasng purchasing
power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and
otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources." (Italics
supplied.) 48 STAT. 195 (1933),
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to wages and hours. That such was the philosophy of the
Act is also apparent from Sections 3 (a) and 7 (a) which
gave the President directory power over wage and hour
agreements of employer and employee. It was intended
that such powers would be supplemented, and the principles
of the Act made effective, by active employee participation
in formulating such agreements.35
Senator Wagner, sponsor of the Recovery Act as well
as the later Act generally designated by his name, also
described the labor provisions of the Recovery Act as pri-
marily economic."
It has been suggested that the Recovery Act accelerated
acceptance of the theory that labor problems were a proper
subject for consideration by the Federal Government,"7 laid
a foundation upon which subsequent administrative agen-
cies built in implementing later legislation,88 stimulated
organization activities and raised wages,s" and gave the
worker a sense of security in negotiations with the em-
ployer."
" The purpose of the Act and the temper of the legislators is indicated m
some degree by the other bills introduced at the same session of Congress, the
titles of which aptly illustrate their purpose; e. g., S. 1555 introduced by Sen-
ator Walsh "To encourage planning in industry by permitting controlled co-
operation and protecting agriculture, labor and consumer and to supplement
the powers of the Federal Trade Commission", H.R. 5801 by Representative
Hoeppel "To add to the purchasing power of the nation and to uphold and sup-
port the President in his declaration for a restoration of wages to meet the
rising commodity price levels, and for other purposes."
Another bill, H.R. 5664, on the same subject matter as H.R. 5755 was
referred to the House Committee on 'Ways and Means on May 17, 1933, and
never was reported out. See 77 CONG. REc. 3610.
' Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958. 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) p. 35.
"Twentieth Century Fund, LAo AND GOVERNMENT, p. 355 (1985).
"Lolzwn AND LUDICm, LABOR RELATIONS BOARDS, p. 457 (1935).
go MS.s AND MoNTGooMEY, LAnOR'S PROGOSS AND Paontus, pp. 3563875
(1939), Wolman, Accomplishments of N.R.A. ut Labor Legislation, (1935)
25 AM. Lan. Lr.. REv. 38, 41. Prof. Millis is now Chairman of the Board.
"Hearings, supra, note 36, statement of Charlton Ogburn, then General
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Yet there was complete unanimity of opinion during
the Committee hearings and the Congressional debates on
the National Labor Relations Act, that effective enforce-
ment of Section 7 (a) of the National Recovery Act had
broken down. \Mr. Biddle, Chairman of the Board under
Public Resolution 44, testified that it had been substantially
impossible to enforce Section 7 (a),41 a conclusion shared
by Charlton Ogburn"' and William Green, 3 respectively,
General Counsel and President of the American Federa-
tion of Labor The Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, after considering the evidence adduced at the hear-
ings on the National Labor Relations Act, stated, as a
preliminary to its report on that Act, that the "Govern-
ment's promise in Section 7 (a) stands largely unful-
filled,"4 " while the House Report stated that the Act pro-
posed to make a "serious" effort to enforce the mandate
of Section 7 (a)." Senator Wagner, speaking on the
National Labor Relations Act in the Senate, asserted that
Section 7 (a) had failed, quoting Biddle and General Hugh
Johnson, Administrator of the Recovery Act." Represen-
tatives Connery,7 Witherow,8 and Truax," among others,
emphasized the failure of the section during House debates
on the Act.
The breakdown of Section 7 (a) having been earlier
perceived, the forerunner of the present National Labor
Counsel, American Federation of Labor, at 151, BEARD AND BERA, AMEMRCA
I: .MID-PASSAGr, p. 521 (1939).
41 Hezrmgs, supra. note 34. at 93.
"lbid., at 149-151.
"Ibud., at 101, 102.
"SE . Rzp. No. 573. 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
"H. RrP. No. 1147. 74th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 3 (1935).
79 CONG. ReC. 7568 (1935). Hereafter, where no year is given in the
citnxon from the Congressional Record the reference will be to the year 1935.
"Ibid., at 9683.
" Ibid., at 9691.
"Ibid.. at q7l5.
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Relations Act was introduced at the Second Session of the
73rd Congress in the form of identical bills, designated as
S. 2926, and H. R. 8432,"° sponsored by Senator Wagner
and Representative Connery. Each bill was entitled "A
bill to equalize the bargaining power of employers and
employees, to encourage the amicable settlement of disputes
between employers and employees, to create a National
Labor Board, and for other purposes. " The bills were not
passed, but another bill designated as Public Resolution 44,
purporting to implement Section 7 (a), was substituted
therefor, and carried." The Resolution authorized Board
implementation of 7 (a) only for the purpose of elections.
There were still no effective sanctions of any kind available
for application to employers violating the statutory pro-
visions of the section by the National Labor Relations
Board," a limitation which received some consideration
during the Congressional debates on the subject." The
S.2926 and H.R. 8432, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
"The purpose of the Resolution was stated by the President in a press re-
lease to be that it "establishes upon a firm statutory basis the additional ma-
chinery by which the United States Government will deal with labor relations,
and particularly with difficulties arising in connection with collective bargaining,
labor elections, and labor representation." (Quoted by Biddle, Hearings,
sufra, note 81, at p. 76.) The resolution authorized the President to appoint
a board to investigate violations of section 7 (a), and to order and conduct an
election by a secret ballot of any of the employees of any employer, to de-
termine by what person or persons or organization they desire to be repre-
sented in order to insure the right of employees to organize and to select their
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining as defined in section
7 (a) of the Act and now incorporated herein." The Act further provides that
for the purposes of such election the Board might order production of wit-
nesses, records, etc., and that its orders might be enforced as were those of the
Federal Trade Commission; that the Board might make regulations to carry
out the provisions of the Resolution and assure freedom from coercion m elec-
tions; that the right to strike was not abridged; and that the resolution was
to continue in force until the National Industrial Recovery Act was terminated.
48 STAT. 1148 (1934), Pub. Res. No. 44, H. J. Res. No. 375.
' Pursuant to the Resolution, the name of the Board was changed from
"National Labor Board" to "National Labor Relations Board."
"78 CoxG. Ryac. 12017 (1934).
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Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor stated during the course of debates on the Resolu-
tion that it "should be considered as a substitute and as a
temporary measure pending the convening of the next
Congress."'" Other senators declared their conviction that
the Resolution would help but little to implement the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act so as to permit effective
enforcement of Section 7 (a)," and the sponsor of the
Resolution in the Senate declared it to be "minimum" legis-
lation."" Political expediency had apparently dictated the
shelving of S. 2926 and H. R. 8432, and an attempt to
secure the passage of these bills at the last moment failed."
'Ibid., at 116:35.
'See Statement of Sen. Nyc, Ibid., at p. 12047, and Senator Wheeler, Ibid.
" Speech of Senator Robinson, Ibid., p. 11635;
'The history of these bills is interesting. S.2926 was introduced into the
Senate by Sen. Wagner on March 1, 1934 (Hearings, supra, note 36, at 9),
and after it was introduced, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor substituted another bill, retaining most ot the features of the
Wagner bill, as S.1260 (Ibid., at 16), which was reported on May 10 (Ibid., at
22). Sen. Wagner then withdrew his bill and urged the passage of Pub. Res.
44, introduced by Sen. Robinson, saying" "The Congress and the country dur-
ing the past year have united in passing and applying the most varied and
swceping changes in our economic life that have ever occurred in so short a
time. Perhaps it may be a good thing to allow these reforms to encounter an
additional period of trial and error, so that the processes of education and un-
derstanding may catch up with the social program that has been inaugurated.
That is the judgment of the President with regard to the labor disputes bill.
and I am prepared to go along with him The substitute measure which
the President has proposed is designed simply to meet serious and immediate
difficult . The sole purpose of the present joint resolution is to permit
a board or boards established by the President to hold elections of employees
in an atmosphere free from the coercion, interference or restraint that is pro-
hibited by section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act as incorporated
in the resolution." (78 CoxG. REc. 12018 (1934)). Senator McNary announced
the decision of the Republican senators to support the resolution. (78 CONG.
Rtc. 11M35).
The opposition to the Resolution, arising among those who favored the
original Wagner proposals included Senators Norris, LaFollette, Cutting and
Walsh. (Ibid., at 12016-120Z .) Senator LaFollette offered the original Wag-
ner Act, with Wagner's amendments, as a substitute for the resolution, but later
withdrew it. (Ibid.. at 12024-4)
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The effect of the passage of Public Resolution 44 was
negligible, for as stated by the House Committee in its
report on the National Labor Relations Act, the boards
created thereunder had all of the weaknesses of the former
boards in preventing and restraining violations of Section
7 (a) " Employers, fearful of governmental intervention
in labor matters, felt they might safely concur in the pas-
sage of the Resolution"9 and their conclusions were justified
by the subsequent ineffectiveness of the legislation. The
Resolution itself is not of major importance in ascertaining
the legislative intent of Congress in adopting the National
Labor Relations Act during the following session. It is
important to note, however, that the Congress had become
aware that the pious hope for improved employer-employee
relationships expressed in Section 7 (a) could not be real-
ized without considerable administrative machinery for the
enforcement of the Act. It is also important to note that
the nature of the duties of the Board changed under the
Resolution, and the promotion of mediation activities for-
merly considered to be the primary purpose of the Board,"
Report, supra, note 45, at 4.
The following letter was written by the vice-president of a large industrial
organization contemporaneously with the consideration and passage of Public
Resolution 44 "My guess is that Congress will today pass the joint resolution
proposed as an alternative to the Wagner bill, and that will end, for the time
being, at least, many of our troubles in that respect. Personally, I view the
passage of the joint resolution with equanimity. It means that temporary
measures, which cannot last more than a year, will be substituted for the per-
manent legislation proposed in the original Wagner bill. I do not believe that
there will again be as good a chance for the passage of the Wagner Act as
exists now, and the trade is a mighty good compromise.
"I have read carefully the joint resolution, and my personal opinion is
that it is not going to bother us very much. For one thing, it would be neces-
sary, if the newly created boards are to order and supervise elections in our
plants, that they first set aside as invalid the election just completed.
"I do not think this can be done. If, in 1935, our elections should occur in
the second half of June rather than in the first half, the board would have to
automatically be legislated out of existence before that date.
"If they try to horn in on us in any situation in the meantime, I think we
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gave way to functions of investigation and fact finding,
although no authority to enforce its findings was given
to it."'
The contemporary analysis of the causes for the failure
of Section 7 (a) is extremely important, for the National
Labor Relations Act must be considered primarily as an
attempt to cure the deficiencies of the Recovery Act in its
proposals to assist in equalizing bargaining power of em-
have our fences pretty securely set up. Therefore, and for other reasons, I
am in favor of compromising by not opposing passage of the joint resolution.
This, of course, is my own personal opinion. I have not yet had a chance to
clear it with our people here." Read by Senator Wagner in the United States
Senate on May 14, 1935. (79 CONG. REc. 7569). Also cited in H. REP. No. 1147,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1935), and in FELLER AND HuRwiTz, How
TO DEAL WITH ORGAIZED LABOR, p. 176 (1937).
Cf., Labor and the Gozernment, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND (1935), at
1, o2. The new Board made decisions involving violation of law, however,
tollowing an executive order subsequently issued and providing as follows:
"(2) The powers and functions of said Board shall he as follows-
(a) To settle by mediation, conciliation, or arbitration all controversies
between employers and employees which tend to impede the purposes of the
National Industrial Recovery Act: provided, however, the Board may decline
to take cognizance of controversies between employers and employees in any
field of trade or industry where a means of settlement, provided for by agree-
ment, industrial code, or federal law, has not been invoked.
(b) To establish local or regional boards upon which employers and em-
ployees shall be equally represented, and to delegate thereto such powers and
territorial jurisdiction as the National Board may determine Executive
Order No. 6511, December 16, 1933.
This order was in turn followed by Executive Order No. 6580, February
1, 1934, which provided, as amended by Executive Order No. 6612-A, February
23, 1934, that: " 2. Whenever the National Labor Board shall find that
an employer has interfered with the Board's conduct of an election or has de-
clined to recognize or bargain collectively with a representative or representa-
tives of the employees adjudged by the Board to have been selected in accord-
ance with section 7 (a) or has otherwise violated or is refusing to comply with
said section 7 (a), the Board, in its discretion, may report such findings and
make recommendations to the Attorney General or to the Compliance Division
of the National Recovery Administration. The Compliance Division shall not
review the findings ot the Board but it shall have power to take appropriate
action based thereon."
'Cf., Labor and the Government, TwENIETH CENTURY FUND (1935),
at 203.
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ployers and employees. Writers on labor problems have
ascribed the breakdown of Section 7 (a), in part, to its
ambiguity," and more particularly, to the failure of Con-
gress to insert proper enforcement provisions in the Re-
covery Act.6" Recently, historians have attached a major
portion of the blame for the failure of 7 (a) to union
officials and divisions within the ranks of labor on jurisdic-
tional matters," although the split between the American
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organ-
izations had not then occurred. At the hearings on the
National Labor Relations Act, proponents of the Act pre-
sented more explicit reasons for the breakdown of Section
7 (a) to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor
The reasons given included the delays in enforcement of
Board orders regarding unfair labor practices, claimed to
arise out of the failure or refusal of the Department of
Justice to enforce the Act;" delays in holding elections,
because of a consistent practice of employers in appealing
election orders of the Board to the courts;" creation of
company unions which impeded realistic collective bargain-
ing;"7 and most of all, lack of statutory authority which
would enable the agency administering the Act to enforce
I FELLER AND HURWITZ, How To DEAL WITH ORGANIZED LABOR, 172, 173,
(1937).
Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon. the Development of
Collective Bargaining, (1937) 50 HAnv. L. REv. 1071, at 1089.
' BEARD AND BEARD, op. cit., supra, note 40 at 520, 521.
' OGBURN, supra, note 36, at 150; cf., 'Biddle, at 93. Out of 83 cases re-
ferred to the Department of Justice, suit has been brought on only one, the
remainder being delayed for various reasons.
"Ibid., Green, at 111, 112; Biddle, at 90-97.
"Hearings, supra, note 36, at p. 40, wherein Sen. Wagner stated. "Over
69 per cent of the plans (for company unions) now in existence have been
inaugurated since the passage of the Recovery, Act." Note, also TEAD AND
M T CALF, LABOR RELATIONS UNDER THE RECOVERY AcT, (193-3), an illustration
of methods of promoting and developing company unions, issued immediately
after passage of the Recovery Act.
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specified sanctions for a violation of the Act. " The Report
of the House Committee on Labor relating to the National
Labor Relations Act stated: ". . . in crucial cases of re-
calcitrant employers the Board has been up against a stone
wall of legal obstacle." 9
The Senate Committee on Education and Labor re-
ported that the breakdown of Section 7 (a) and Public
Resolution 44 was caused by ambiguity, excessive general-
ity, excessive diffusion of administrative responsibility, dis-
advantageous tie-ups with codes of fair competition, ab-
;ence of power vested in the Board, and obstacles to elec-
tions ordered by the Board. It is significant that with
reference to the National Labor Relations Act subsequently
passed, the Committee said:
A recital of weaknesses in these laws, however, will indicate that
the defects are neither intrinsic nor irremediable, but may be cured
by the corrective steps taken in the present bill."'
Hearings, svpra, note 36, Biddle, at 93; Wagner, at 47.
"Report, supra, note 45, at 4-6. At p. 6, it is stated. "The stark fact is
iAt after two years of Section 7 (a) the Government has succeeded in getting
11L the courts only four cases for enforcement, two being proceedings in equity
aui two criminal proceedings; and only one of these cases (the Weirton case)
has come to trial. While in the public mind the National Labor Relations
-,ard is probably regarded as responsible for the enforcement of Section 7 (a),
the complete control of litigation is vested in the Department of Justice and
tt. arious United States attorneys throughout the country." Cf., Biddle and
Ogburn, supra, note 110.
Report, supra, note 44, at 5-6. On the question of the absence of power
vested in the Board, the report stated at p. 5: "The present National Labor
Relations Board, which is the primary agency entrusted with the safeguarding
of Section 7 (a), has no quasi-judicial power. It must seek enforcement
through reference to the Department of Justice. Since the Board has no power
to subpoena, except in connection with elections, the records which it builds
up are based in many cases upon the testimony of complaints along, supple-
mented at best by the testimony of such witnesses as the defendants voluntarily
present. This makes it necessary for the Department of Justice, in any event
to make further investigations before bringing suit in court, and if suit is
brought at all, it must commence entirely de nova m court, with the defendant
having 30 days to answer, or moving to dismiss, or applying for bill of par-
ticulars. Thus is defeated the very purpose of aft ad,minstrative agency, which
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Members of Congress engaged in little discussion of
the reasons for the failure of Section 7 (a) and Public
Resolution 44 during the debates on the adoption of the
National Labor Relations Act. The assumption seemed
rather to be that Section 7 (a) had failed, that the Act
under consideration was created to eliminate the causes
for the failure as indicated by the reports of the Commit-
tees; and that Congress ought to adopt the judgment of the
Committees that the second act would perform such func-
tions. The debates were concerned principally with the
scope and effect of the proposed bill. Few proponents of
the new legislation sought to labor the point regarding the
failure of the Recovery Act; nor did opponents of the
proposed statute attack its bases therein. In connection
with the few statements made relating to the failure of
the former Act, however, some references were made to
the causes of such failure. 1
THE WAGNER ACT AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
THE CONTENT OF THE STATUTE
Doubtless, the primary purpose of the National Labor
Relations Act, as indicated by the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, was to render the provisions of
Section 7 (a) actually effective. However, the range of
the Congressional investigation extended over a much
is to provide specialized treatment of the factual aspects of a specialized type
of controversy." Cf., supra, note 59.
'79 CONG. REc. 7668, 7569 (Sen. Wagner), 9683 (Rep. Connery), 9709
(Rep. Wood). Rep. Truax pointedly called the attention of the House to the
"refusal" of the Department of Justice to enforce the labor provisions of the
Recovery Act. (Ibnd., 9715). Referring to company unions, Sen. Wagner stated
that company unions rose from a membership of 432,000, in 1932, to 1,164,000
in 19M, representing a gain of 169%. (Ibid., 7670). Sen. Walsh called attention
to the fact that court appeals had destroyed the efficacy even of the election
provisions of Pub. Res. 44, and that the failure of 7 (a) of the Recovery Act
resulted from the failure of the Act to provide adequate sanctions to imple-
ment enforcement. (Ibid., 7658).
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wider area than the simple principles enunciated in Section
7 (a), and the testimony given at the hearings on the Act
and the Congressional debates furnish most cogent evi-
dence of the attitude of Congress upon certain features of
the Act and the exact method in which Congress expected
the Act to function under various circumstances stated.
While most of the debate in the Senate took place be-
fore the Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional, 2 the
bill did not reach the House until after the decision of the
Supreme Court holding the Act invalid." Consequently,
although there was but little discussion of the question of
constitutionality in the Senate," the House considered the
problem at length."5 The discussions of constitutionality
are important primarily because therein the proponents of
the measure emphasized the economic aspects of the legis-
lation: i. e., that Congress had power to remove certain
sources of industrial strife and unrest tending to burden
and obstruct interstate commerce by encouraging collective
bargaining between employers and employees.
For it is clear that Congress considered the basis of
the Act to be economic. The theory of balancing the
economic keel of the country by equalization of bargaining
power of employer and employee, which in turn would
raise both real and monetary wages, was primary in its
consideration. The idea was enunciated by the language
'The Act was debated in the Senate, for most part, on May 15, 1935. 79
Cor.. REc. 7547-7638. The Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional in
Schechtcr Poultry Corp. v. U S., 295 U. S. 495, decided on May 27, 1935.
" The House debates began on June 19, 1935. 79 CONG. REc. 9650-9732.
" See comments of Sen. Wagner, 79 CONG. REc. 7751-2, 7565, ff.
"' The discussion as to constitutionality in the House became quite acrnmoni-
ous. Especially interesting were the comments of the following Representa-
tives Lehlbach, 79 CoNG. REC. 9778; Cox, Ibid., Sabath, Ibid., 9680; Hollister,
Ibid., 96 1, Connery, Ibid., 96S4, Rich, Ibid., 9688, 9690; Halleck, Ibid., 9691,
Smith, Ibid., 9692, 9694-9, Marcantino, Ibid., 9700; Blanton, Ibid., 9700, 9701,
Tarver, Ibid., 9707, Wood, Ibid., 9709; Truax, Ibid., 9714.
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of the "Findings and Policy" provisions," the Report of
the Senate Committee, which listed the two objectiies of
the bill as industrial peace and economic adjustment," and
the Report of the House Committee in which it was said.
The committee wishes to emphasize particularly the objective of
the bill to remove certain important sources of industrial unrest
engendered, first, by the denial of the right of employees to organize
and by the refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining, and second, by failure to adjust wages, hours, and
working conditions traceable to the absence of processes fundamental
to the friendly adjustment of such disputes. 8
In introducing the bill, Senator Wagner reviewed sta-
tistics showing concentration of wealth, reflected briefly on
the evils attendant upon the problems arising out of tech-
nical obsolescence, and restated the argument familiar
under the Recovery Act that the stability in labor relations
to be insured by the Act would result in increased wages
for the worker, which in turn would ultimately result in
the economic rehabilitation of the country." The same
theories had been manifest all through the Senate Com-
mittee hearings on the Act.8"
"' The provisions of the Act relating to findings and policy are quite ex-
tended, due doubtless in part to the questions of constitutionality raised by
opponents to its passage.
Section one concludes as follows: "It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions
to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate those obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collec-
tive bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutual aid or protection." (49 STAT. 449).
'Report, .rpra, note 44, at 1-4.
' Report, sitpra, note 45, at 8.
79 CoG. REc. 7667. Former Representative (now Senator) Mead of
New York, also, discussed this portion of the economic approach in the House,
ibid., at 9711.
'E.g., the idea was expounded at length during the hearing by Lloyd K.
Garrison, former Chairman of the old Labor Relations Board, (Hearings,
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The most significant portions of the legislative history
of the Act are, of course, to be found in an examination of
particular provisions of the Act extensively discussed in
the passage of the bill, particularly the sections dealing
with substantive rights.
It is interesting to note that the framers of the Act
were especially careful when creating the Act to designate
clearly what specific labor practices, among others, should
be considered as unfair when committed by the employer.
They sought thereby to fortify the administrators in the
performance of their duties by setting forth a list of specifi-
cally forbidden labor practices so that the courts might
know what activities Congress intended to proscribe. As
Senator LaFollette said in the debates on Public Resolution
44, in 1934:
The experience of the Federal Trade Commission has shown that
the courts give a restrictive interpretation to such a general phrase
as "unfair methods of competition." It is, therefore, important that
unfair labor practices should be defined explicitly 8I
The force and effect of the provisions of the Act pro-
hibiting the creation of company unions has already been
supra, note 36, at 12.5) as well as by Ogburn (ibid., at 153) and by Biddle
(ibid., at 77).
78 CONG. REc. 12023 (1934). The idea was also expressed during the
>cuate hearings by Sen. Wagner, Hearings, su pra, note 36, at 38, and during
the debates on the Act. 79 CONG. REG. 7596. Note also, statement of James
Hart, The Exercise of the Rule Making Power and the Preparation of Pro-
posed Lgtslative Measures by Adinistrative Departmntts, (1937), at p. 16
"If Congress gives an administrative organ a mere empty formula for its man-
date, and then simply tells it to apply this formula by the case-to-case method,
the courts are apt to interfere, for interpretation of this formula is a question
of law on which the courts have the last word. The famous Gratz case [Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920)] is an example.
But if Congress delegates to the adrmnistrative organ the power to supplement
its policy by complementary rules and regulations having the force and effect
of law, then the courts will interfere only if the delegation is unconstitutional
or the rules and regulations are ultra vires."
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considered in part.82 The problem was considered at length
during the hearings, especially by Lloyd K. Garrison, for-
mer Chairman of the National Labor Board under Section
7 (a), 2 as well as by Chairman Biddle" and Mr. Ogburn,"5
all of whom stressed the disadvantages of employer sup-
port of, or interference with, the organizations designated
by employees as their agencies for collective bargaining.
The reports of the Committees deal with company union-
ism with severity, the House report especially denouncing
company dominated organizations where "the employer sits
on both sides of the table" and makes a "sham" and a
"mockery" of collective bargaining." In the debates, com-
pany unions received universal condemnation, and their
unpopularity was relied upon heavily by proponents of the
Act in securing a favorable hearing from the Congress."
An amendment to the Act offered in the House by Repre-
sentative Lloyd, which would have the effect of allowing
an employer to contribute financial and other support to
a labor organization, was rejected without a division.
So, also, the provisions of the Act relating to the duty
" See supra, text to note 67. See also, mlra, note 171, and text.
'Hearings, supra, note 36, at 129-131. Many of the objections urged
against "company" unions are also valid against "independent" unions. For
instance, Dean Garrison especially emphasized the advantages of representation
of employees by individuals not employed by the same employer and hence not
subject to economic coercion by him, lack of knowledge of company unions of
nation-wide conditions affecting matters concerning hours and wages; and that
such unions could not engage in making industry-wide agreements which in
some cases would be the only practical means of collective bargaining.
"Ibid., at 82.
Ibid., at 148, 149.
"Report, sapra, note 44 at 17, 18. See also report, .tpra, note 45 at 9, 10.
6 79 CONG. REc. 7569, 7570 (Senator Wagner), 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (Sen-
ator Robinson), 79 CONG. Rac. 7660 (Senator Walsh), 79 CoNG. REC. 9682
(Representative Griswold), 79 CONG. REc. 9685 (Representative Connery),
79 CoNG. REC. 9691 (Representative Witherow), 79 CONG. Rac. 9699 (Repre-
sentative Marcantino), 79 CONG. Rac. 9716 (Representative Truax), 79 CoNG.
Rc. 9719 (Representative O'Malley).
79 CONG. REc. 9727.
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of the employer to bargain collectively with his employees
were thoroughly discussed at the Senate Committee hear-
ings and during the Congressional debates. The provision
of the Act requiring collective bargaining was inserted as
an amendment during the hearings at the request of Mr
Biddle,"9 who was supported, among others, by Mr. Garri-
son." Both Senator Wagner and Representative Connery
pointed out the provisions of the Act did not require
the employer to come to an agreement with the employees
but did require him to bargain with them in good faith.9
There was little discussion, either in the Committee re-
ports or in Congressional debates, of the provisions of the
Act prohibiting an employer from discriminating against
an employee because of membership in or activity on behalf
of a labor organization." The discussion relating to Sec-
tion 8 (3) of the Act, dealing with discrimination, centered
principally around the closed shop question which recurred
constantly throughout the course of the debates."
Those advocating defeat of the bill urged that the bill
encouraged the creation of closed shop agreements by
specifically excluding such agreements from the discrim-
Hearings, supra, note 36 at 4, 79.
',Ibid., at 136, 137.
" 79 CONG. Ri~c. 7570 (Sen. Wagner); 79 CONG. REc. 9685-986 (Rep.
Connery).
" Sen. Wagner, ibid., Chairman Biddle, Hearings, supra, note 36 at p. 81.
"Section 8 (3) provided as follows "By discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Promded, That
nothing in this Act, or in the National Industrial Recovery Act (U. S. C., Supp.
VII, title 15, sees. 701-712), as amended from time to time, or in any code or
agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor orgamzation (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action de-
fined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of em-
ployment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative
of the employees as provided in Section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bar-
naimn, unit covered by such agreement when made."
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ination clause of the proposed law."4 Proponents of the
measure replied that the purpose of the language of Sec-
tion 8 (3) was to allow the states to approve or disapprove
the closed shop in their respective- jurisdictions by legis-
lation." Two amendments to the Act were introduced in
the House to restrict the right of labor organizations to
demand a closed shop. The amendments were rejected
without a division."'
Another question extensively examined at all times
during the consideration of the bill was the claimed par-
tiality of the Act toward the employee without compensat-
ing privileges granted to the employer At no place in the
legislative process does the intention of Congress to outline
a bill of rights for labor of an unprecedented scope become
more clearly manifest." Such intention is significant, for
in itself it displays the Congressional intention to endow
the enforcing agency with wide implementary powers in
order that the effective execution of the broad powers of
the statute could be made. As has been observed, the Act is
bottomed upon an attempt to give the employees equality
of bargaining power with the employer " Particularly
E.g., Rep. Taber; 79 CONG. REc. 9726.
E. g. Sen. Wagner, 79 CoNG. REC. 7570, Cf., Rep. Connery, 79 CoNG.
REc. 9726.
'Representatives Taber and Biermann introduced the bills. See 79 CONG.
REc. 9726.
" The frankness with which the approach was taken is illustrated also in
the discussion at the hearings and in Congress relating to the "company union"
question, discussed utfra.
' See paragraph two of Section 1 of the Act, stating that: "the inequality
of -bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in
the corporate or other forms of ownership association, substantially burdens
and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners
in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries." See also Dean Garrison's
plea for equality of opportunity for collective bargaining, Hearings, irnpra, note
36 at 127.
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vehement objections were raised because of the failure of
the Act to provide sanctions against coercion by employees.
Some consideration was given to the matter during the
Senate hearings," and the report of the Senate committee'o
contained a full discussion of the question of coercion by
employees, defending the form of the bill, and pointing out
that existing law was sufficiently comprehensive to deal
with the problems suggested. It is significant that the
report stated. "To say that employees and labor organiza-
tions should be no more active than employers in the or-
ganization of employees is untenable; this would defeat
the very purpose of the bill." Fear was also expressed that
the courts might interpret any conduct of an employee as
being "coercion", and the report expressed the desire of
the committee to avoid such judicial interference. During
debate on the bill Senator Tydings offered an amendment
to make coercion by employees unlawful.' The most ex-
tensive debate on any individual issue during the consid-
eration of the Act then ensued, the amendment being sup-
ported by Senators Couzens, Borah and Hastings,"2 who
urged the adoption of the amendment on the ground that
the Act ought to protect employees from being coerced by
other employees as well as protecting them from being
coerced by the employer The amendment was attacked
" Hearings, supra, note 86, at 47, (statement by Senator Wagner) and 78
(tatement of Chairman Biddle of the Board).
" Report, strpra, note 44 at 16, 17. The problem is not directly considered
m th House Report, but the general tenor of the document is the same as that
of the Senate Report. Referring to the proposal for the inclusion of a pro-
hibition against coercion by the employees the report stated. "The only results
of introducing proposals of this sort into the bill, in the opinion of the Com-
mittee, would be to overwhelm the Board in every case with counter-charges
and recriminations that would prevent it from doing the task that needs to be
done."
179 CoNG. axc. 7633. The suggestion of Senator Tydings was not new.
It had received considerable congressional discussion during the preceding ses-
5ion. 79 ConG-. Rrc. 12l (19.4 ).
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by Senators Wagner, Norris, Barkley and Walsh," 3 who
reiterated the arguments urged in the Committee report
that such a provision might be invoked by the courts
against labor,"4 and that the rights of the employees were
amply protected against coercion of parties other than the
employer by existing law. 5 The amendment was voted
down by a roll call vote of 50 to 21."' A similar amend-
ment to the Railway Labor Act had been derailed in the
legislative process the previous year .' In the House, the
substance of the Tydings amendment was debated prior
to the consideration of amendments to the bill and the gen-
eral construction of the Act to aid the employee by a limi-
tation of previously uncircumscribed privileges of the em-
ployer, was a subject of much discussion. 8 An amend-
ment which embodied the principles of the Tydings amend-
ment was twice offered and defeated without a division.'0 '
Later a similar amendment was presented by Representa-
tive Dean who urged its adoption on the ground that "The
amendment will help the employers to protect their em-
ployees" and that "it would prevent any Communist or
Socialist from . stirring up trouble by antagonizing
employees against employers in a given industry.""' The
amendment was rejected without a record vote."'
Problems relating to the selection of the unit appro-
priate for collective bargaining were apparently not con-
" 79 CONG. REc. 7654 (Couzens), 7654 (Borah), and 7655 (Hastings).
"Ibzd., 7650 (Wagner), 7668 (Norris), 7656 (Barkley) and 7658-7661
(WValsh).
... Ibid., 7657, 7670.
0 Ibid., 7670.
Ibid., 7675.
0 79 CONG. REC. 7671.
... Ibid., 9716 (Truax), 9719 (O'Malley), 9718, 9726 (Connery).
Ibid., 8718, 9726.
1 Ibid., 9726.
.,. Ibid.
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sidered of great importance by Congress at the time of the
consideration of the bill. Chairman Biddle of the Board
emphasized at the Senate hearings that the duty of select-
ing the appropriate unit could be fulfilled only by the
Board.' 2 Only a few comments were made in the Con-
gressional debates concerning Section 9 (c) of the bill,"'
which allowed the Board to make investigations and find-
ings regarding the unit of employees appropriate for col-
lective bargaining purposes. Yet at least one speech in
the House was directed principally at the possibility of
abuse of this power by the Board,"' concern being ex-
pressed principally for those men who were not members
of any union,' and an amendment was urged by Repre-
sentative Ramspeck that employees of more than one em-
ployer should not be included in a unit appropriate for
collective bargaining. The amendment passed the House
but was lost in the joint committee on amendments." 6
' Hearings, supra, note 36 at 83.
" Section 9 (c) of the Act reads as follows "Whenever a question affect-
ing commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the Board
may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the
name or names of the representatives that have been designated or selected. In
any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing
upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under Section 10 or
otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suit-
able method of ascertain [So in the orginal] such representatives."
""Paragraph (a) ot Section 0 ought to be called the sell-out section, for
where the man does not belong to a union he can have his job rated at almost
nothing by the umon promoters. There is not any question about that, and
no one can deny it. This is the worst section of the whole bill Consider
what this provision does-it permits the board to say that the unit shall be a
.'roup in a certain territory. Perhaps in that territory will be plants in which
the employees are perfectly satisfied with the conditions of employment, plants
where there is not the slightest excuse for trouble, but this power to bring that
plant in with other plants can create a situation where these men will be forced
entirely out of their rights . " Rep. Taber, 79 CONG. Rzr- 9705.
"As heretofore suggested, there was no division of labor into groups rep-
resenting the Congress of Industrial Orgamzations and the American Federation
of Labor at this time.
. The amendment was adopted in the House with little discussion. How-
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Though the debate was limited on this feature of the Act,
it is clear that Congress understood generally the nature
of the problems that the Board would be called upon to
face in adjudicating on this question, which subsequently
developed into the most controversial subject considered
by the Board."' In addition, a number of bitter general
criticisms were made of the Act, all of which indicated an
understanding of the possible scope of the legislation."'
Numerous amendments to the Act were also proposed
in the House, all emphasizing the extent and nature of the
legislation proposed. In addition to suggested amendments
already discussed, amendments were introduced to extend
the benefits of the Act to agricultural workers ;19 to impose
ever, Rep. Wood called attention to the fact that the United Mine Workers
were then attempting to get a trade-wide agreement with coal operators affect-
ing five or six hundred thousand workers, and expressed concern over the
effect of the amendment upon such negotiations; Rep. Ramspeck rejoined that
the amendment would not preclude negotiations upon authority of the individual
unions. The amendment passed by a vote of 127 to 87. 79 CoNG. REc. 9727,
9728. The conference report eliminating the amendment was later adopted by
the House. 79 CoxG. R~c. 10300. The intention and effect of the amendment
and compromise thereon was later a subject of disagreement between the Board
and Rep. Ramspeck. See 2 HousE HEARINGS, 604-6, 608-9, 636-9.
" Rep. Taber also introduced an amendment in the House looking to elim-
ination of the provision in the Act giving the Board power to select the bar-
gaining unit, saying- "Under the bill the Board could create units or dis-
tricts or territory over which a single operation or decision or bargaining could
take place, which would include plants where the employees did not belong to
the union at all and were perfectly satisfied with their situations, and would
throw them right out of employment I hope the committee will adopt this
amendment and prevent such an outrage happening." (The House was then
sitting as a Committee of the Whole.) The amendment was lost by a vote of
78 to 43. 79 CoNG. REc. 9727.
"' It was claimed and denied that the passage of the legislation would cause
more strikes (Rep. Connery at 79 CONG. REc. 9687, Rep. Rich at 9688, 9690;
Rep. Blanton at 9702; Rep. Ekwall at 9704, Rep. Sweeney at 9705, and Rep.
Faddis at 9706), that the act was inspired by and promoted for the sole benefit
of the American Federation of Labor (Representative Rich at 79 CoNG. REc.
9689; and Senator Tydings at 9672), and that the bill was "class legislation"
(Rep. Eaton at 79 CONG. Rac. 9680).
' By Rep. Marcantino, who submitted a minority report as a member of
the House Committee considering the Act (Hearings, sumpra, note 78 at 26-30) in
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a duty on the Board to regulate and control intra-union
activities by examination of union books and records, and
the supervision of its internal affairs;12 to create a bi-
partisan Board :12 to limit the right to strike;12 to place
the Board under civil service,'23 and to write into the bill
a guaranty of the right of free speech. -4  It was argued
which he advocated the inclusion of agricultural workers within the meaning
of the term "employees" The amendment was rejected viva voce. 79 CONG.
Rtc. 9720, 9721.
" By Rep. Rich. The amendment was extremely broad in its scope and
limited the benefits ot the Act to such unions as would file an agreement with
the Board to refrain from many actions inevitable in the exercise of the right
to strike. The following colloquy took place upon the reading of the bill.
"Mr. Lesinski. It looks like a bankers' bill. Mr. Rich. Mr. Chairman,
I wish to state that the amendment itself does its own speaking and it is not
necessary for any member of Congress to make any comment on it at this time."
The amendment was rejected without a division. 79 CoNG. REc. 9721.
By Rep. Ekwall. Rejected by a vote of 79 to 97, without debates. 79
CoN.G. REc. 9725.
'By Rep. Bierniann. Rejected by a vote of 107 to 140. 79 CONG. REc.
By Rep. Ekwall. The amendment was rejected without a count of the
members and without debate. 79 CONG. REC. 9726.
"The provision, being House Amendment No. 23, was adopted without
debate and without division (79 CONG. R c. 97:30) and reads as follows
"Nothing in this act shall abridge treedom of speech, or of the press, as
guaranteed in the first amendment to the Constitution." The committee of
Conference on Amendments to the Act struck the amendment for the reason,
as indicated in the committee report, that "the Amendment could not possibly
have had any legal effect, because it was merely a restatement of the first
amendment to the Constitution, which remains the law of the land regardless
of congressional declaration." 79 Co :.. REc. 10299, 10300.
In view of the prior attention given by Congress to the provisions of the
Act extending protection to employees in union organizational pursuits, it
seems probable that the provision was intended to preserve the right of the
employer to express his opinion concerning the advisabilitv of union organiza-
tion.
In an exhaustive opinion on the subject of free speech, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in N L. R. B. v. Ford Motor Company, 114 F (2d) 905
(1940) cert. den. on other grounds, 61 S. Ct. 621 (1941), reaffirmed its conclu-
sion in Midland Steel Products Co. v. N L. R. B., 113 F (2d) 800 (1940)
that "Unless the right of free speech is enjoyed by employers as well as by
employees the guaranty of the First Amendment is futile for it is fundamental
that the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution belong equally to every
pcron." No referenct. is made in the opinion to the legislative history of the
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also that a strike ought to be designated as violative of
the spirit of the Act where it occurred after consummation
of an agreement between the employer and the union and
in the violation of the contract."'5
Much criticism of the Board and the Act has centered
around the procedural problems involved in the enforce-
ment of the provisions of the law over the past five years.
It therefore becomes especially important to note the course
of the legislative process with respect to the powers and
duties of the Board in the administration of the law So,
also, Congressional suggestions and limitations as to the
implementation of the Act may be enlightening as to the
proper place the administration of the statute ought to
occupy in an economy principally conceived to promote
national defense effectively.
The most enlightening features of the legislative proc-
ess in disclosing the type of administrative procedure
sought to be authorized by Congress are, of course, found
in the disputes and declarations as to the administrative
implementation specifically required by the Act itself. With
the breakdown of Section 7 (a) green in their several
memories, the proponents of the Act granted ample in-
vestigatory powers to the Board in Section 11 of the Act,
especially including the power of subpoena both with and
without demand for the production of documents. A clear-
cut and well-defined method of enforcement of the decrees
of the Board on appeal to the courts was set up in Section
10, subsections (e) and (f) Proponents of the bill were
especially anxious to avoid having a trial de novo before
the federal courts, a practice existing under Section
7 (a).8 There was little opposition to the adoption of
those procedures during the debates in the Senate and in
'= See note 122, supra.
Cf., Biddle, Heanngs, supra, note 36 at 94.
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fact the author and principal proponent of the bill, Senator
Wagner, spent but little time at the hearing or in the de-
bates discussing the procedural features of the Act. 2 ' In
the House, however, a bitter attack was made on the power
extended to the Board to subpoena witnesses and to peti-
tion the courts for imprisonment of the party subpoenaed
in the event that the subpoena was not obeyed. The in-
ability to get evidence before the Board had caused much
of the breakdown of Section 7 (a)1. 8 and the retention of
the subpoena power was considered correspondingly impor-
tant to the effective operation of the Act. Violent objection
to the provision was made by Representative Blanton, who
read to the House the section of the Act providing that
agents of the Board should have power to examine records
and subpoena attendance of employers, and stated
And if such employer should refuse to be thus examined, or to
allow snoopers to go through the books of his establishment at will,
or should refuse to jump across the United States at the command
of such agent, and take all of his books and records of his business
with him to place before such agent, he is to be punished for contempt
under this bill.12''
1" Wagner, Ibid., at 32; 79 CONG. REc. 7565-7574. References to enforce-
ment sections of the bill are made at p. 7569 and at pp. 47-49 of the Hearings,
supra, note 36.
' Biddle, Hearings, supra, note 36 at 94-95 and Wagner, 79 COirG. REc.
7Uh9. See also, supra, note 70.
79 CONG. REc. 9702. Rep. Blanton's entire speech follows the tenor of
the above quotation. The potentialities for abuse latent in the grant of the
subpcena power to the Board were remarked upon the Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Adtmistrative Procedure, in which present Board
procedures with respect to subpCenas were criticized as follows.
"The Board furnishes to the trial examiner and to the Regional Director
subpoenas signed in blank, application must be made to the former for issuance
of subpoenas during the course of the hearing, while the latter will issue them
prior to the hearing. The Board's trial attorney customarily obtains his sub-
poenas before the hearing begins, but the degree of supervision exercised over
him in their use varies from region to region, it is not always required that
ht justify as other parties must, the issuance of a subpoena at this stage. The
Committee recommends that the practice, which has persisted in some regions,
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Representative Blanton offered no substitute for the above
provision, and no extended discussion of this power was
thereafter had.
Objection was made also to the portion of the Act
which provided that rules of evidence appropriate in courts
of law should not be controlling in hearings before the
Board. The provision was criticized severely by Repre-
sentative Smith of Virginia,"n a further attack on the
provision was also made in the House by Representatives
Blanton13' and Taber 132 An amendment proposing to
nullify the clause was rejected by a vote of 84 to 117.' '
of furnishing the Board's trial attorneys with a supply of blank subpoenas, so
that they are not required to apply to the trial examiner even during the
hearing, be abandoned. The Committee perceives no reason why the require-
ment that all parties must justify the issuance of a subpoena should be relaxed
in favor of the Board's attorney, and recommends, accordingly, that Regional
Directors impose uniform standards for all parties." See also Sec. 107 of
"Code of Standards of Fair Administrative Procedure" proposed by the minor-
ity members of the Committee, (Report, p. 217) at p. "221, providing that
subpoenas "shall be issued to private parties as freely as to representatives ot
any agency."
' 79 CONG. REc. 9694. Rep. Smith has been Chairman of the House Com-
mittee investigating the Act and the Board.
1179 CONG. REc. 9701.
' Rep. Taber stated "This provision permits this board to rig up the
proposition without permitting the party who is cited to be heard at all."
79 CONG. REc. 9705.
"In proposing the amendment, Rep. Halleck, also a member of the Com-
mittee to investigate the Board, stated.
If the bill becomes law a national labor relations board is set up
which, as I understand it, will be a quasi-judicial body charged with hearing
and determining certain questions of fact which may be presented to it.
The particular provision to which I object reads as follows. 'In any such pro-
ceeding the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling.'
"I propose to strike out of that sentence the word 'not' and to provide
thereby that the general rules of evidence applying in courts of law and equity
shall prevail. My idea is simply this, that the board is charged with the duty
of determining questions of fact. In my view these facts should be established
as any fact is established in any court, by competent evidence. I do not mean
evidence circumscribed by technical rules, but I do mean that it should be
evidence of fact as distinguished from hearsay, rumors, or reports; that the
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A third objection made to the procedural provisions
of the Act related to the statement in Section 10 (e) that:
"The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive." Representative Smith at-
tacked this procedural provision.. also, but subsequent
persons who are there present and testifying shall testify to such facts as shall
establish the charge." 7R CoNcG. REc. 9729. Under Representative Halleck's
amendment, however, the Board would in fact have been bound by the "evi-
dence circumscribed by technical rules" to which he refers.
The necessity for abrogation of court requirements for rules of evidence
where factual matters are to be decided by administrative agencies, has received
much attention by commentators. A most cogent and concise statement is made
in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Admnustrative Pro-
cedure, supra, note 129, at 70, wherein it is suggested that traditionally such
agencies have not adopted judicial requirements as to the admissibility of
evidence and that "The absence of a jury and the technical subject-matter
with which agencies often deal, all weigh heavily against a requirement that
administrative agencies observe what is known as the 'common law rules' of
evidence for jury trials. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the
objectives of dispatch, elasticity, and simplicity which the administrative process
is designed to promote. An administrative agency must serve a dual purpose
in each case: It must decide the case correctly as between the litigants before
it, and it must also decide the case correctly so as to serve the public interest
which it is charged with protecting. This second important factor makes it
necessary to keep open the channels for the reception of all relevant evidence
which will contribute to an informed result." For other pertinent discussions
as to the necessity of the relaxation of such rules, see Ross, Applicability of
Common Law Rules of Evidence i Proceedings before Workmen's Compensa-
ticn C cmssion, (1.92"2) 36 HAR. L. REv. 263, Wigmore, Adminstrative Boards
and Commissons: Are the Jury Trial Rides of Evidence in Force for Thev4
Inqiuries? (1022) 17 ILL. L. Rv. 263, Thelen, Practice and Proceduce before
Administrative Tribunals, (1028)16 CAL. L. REv. 208, Lavery, (1938) 12 CINN.
L. R. 192, 195; Stephens, Admnimstrative Tribunals and Their Rides of Evi-
dnce, (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 630; Swancara, Exchsionary Rides of Evidence
t Administrative Hearings, (132) 11 ROcKY MT. L. R-v. 77, Aitchinson,
The Morgan Case and Adminstrative Procedure, (1939) 7 GEO. WAsH. L.
RE%,. 703, 722, 723.
' It is somewhat difficult to ascertain the exact nature of Rep. Smith's
objection. The pertinent portion of his remarks follows
"And again, on page 19, line 24, in dealing with the power of the federal
courts to review the decisions of the Board the power of the court is effectively
fettered by this language: 'And the findings of the Board as to the fact [sic],
if supported by the evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive.' Let me
express the hope that if the bill is to be passed that the House will by amend-
ment, so far as is possible, eliminate the most glaring of its defects." 79 CONG.
Rrc. 9694.
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speakers did not advert to the criticism. The attack on
this feature of the legislation is now especially interesting
in view of the proposals of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure. The Committee rec-
ommended, with respect to the weight to be given to the
findings of the trial examiners of the Board hearing com-
plaints of unfair labor practices in the field, that the deci-
sions of hearing commissioners (to replace present trial
examiners) should be final in the absence of exceptions,
and that "where exceptions are to findings of fact, the
Board be reluctant to disturb such findings in the absence
of clear error."'' 5 The recommendation is doubtless appro-
priate from the standpoint of administrative convenience,
and in view of congressional inaction on Representative
Smith's objection may well be considered consonant with
the legislative intent.
THE WAGNER ACT AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
THE NATURE OF THE AGENCY
The hearings, reports, and debates are especially val-
uable in enabling those examining the administrative struc-
ture of the Board to ascertain how far the present organi-
zation of the Board has followed Congressional intention
as to the manner in which the Act ought to be adminis-
tered. One liet motif running through all of the discus-
sions of the Act was that it soughf to create a body for
administrative adjudication similar to the Federal Trade
Commission."' The reasons for the introduction of this
'FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COmMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, at 158 (1941).
' H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., ist Sess. 23 (1935), SEN. REP. No.
573, 74th Cong, 1st Sess. 14 (1935); Hearings, supra, note 36, Sen. Wagner
at 49. Chairman Biddle at 95, 79 CONG. REC. 7569 (Sen. Wagner), Ibid.,
9722 (Rep. Marcantino), Conf. Rep. on S. 1958 (upon amendments to the Act
after passage by each 'branch of Congress), Ibid., 10298, set out, inffra, note.
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comparison by the sponsors of the bill were obvious the
declaration of administrative duties and privileges granted
to the Board, especially the rule making powers, should
be recognized as not revolutionary in nature but as based
upon years of experience in administrative -bodies with
which Congress and the people were reasonably familiar
M'oreover, the internal organization of the Federal Trade
Commission had been approved by the courts and it was
doubtless thought that an organization utilizing the pro-
cedural methods of the Federal Trade Commission would
receive more lenient treatment during the course of in-
cvitable appeals to the courts. Comparison, however, was
no t limited to the Federal Trade Commission, but extended
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and other bodies
as well, so that it is clear that at no time was there any
intent to limit the organization to the exact type exempli-
iled by the Federal Trade Commission.
Another characteristic of the agency which was con-
stantly expressed by those discussing the Act was that the
organization should be "quasi-judicial." During the course
oif the hearings many references to the nature of the
agency as "quasi-judicial" were made, 3' and the committee
reports further emphasized this characteristic of the Board
to be created. The report of the House Committee states
the powers of the Board briefly as follows.
The work of the Board and its agents or agencies, on the other
hand, is quasi-judicial in character, dealing with the investigation and
determination of charges of unfair labor practices as defined in the
bill and questions of representation for the purposes of collective
bargaining. 13'
"Rep. 'Marcantino, ibu., Sen. Wagner, ibid., Biddle, ibid.
'See, H. R. RF,. No. 1147, 74th Cong., lst Sess. 14 (1935). As to pre-
liminary discussion, see Hearings, supra, note 36 at 87 (Chairman Biddle),
it 116 (Green). Mr. Garrison stated that the Board was to be "exclusively
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The Congressional concept of the Act as creating a
"4quasi-judicial" agency led naturally to the erection of
safeguards to insure the independence of those administer-
ing the Act.
During the hearings before the Senate Committee. the
absolute necessity for independence of the Board from any
departmental influence was insisted upon by many of those
testifying concerning the bill. Lloyd Garrison, former
Chairman of the National Labor Board under the Recovery
Act, urged that the Board be entirely independent and
pointed out the necessity that its independence be clearly
established in order that it might gain public confidence.13"
Chairman Biddle of the National Labor Relations Board
judicial," at 131. Note the following interesting colloquy on the proposed
Board (at 39)
"The Chairman (Sen. Walsh). You are setting it up apart from the
Labor Department? Sen. Wagner. Yes; because it is a quasi-judicial body
and ought to be independent of the Labor Department. Sen. Borah. How
do you create a judicial body in this way Sen. Wagner. I do not say that
it is entirely judicial. "
Further reference to the judicial quality of the Board is made in the report
of the conference committee on the Act:
"Section 3 (a) of the Senate bill provided. 'There is hereby created as
ar independent agency in the executive branch of the Governmnt a board to
be known as the "National Labor Relations Board"' House amendment No. 6
strikes out the phrase 'as an independent agency in the executive branch of
the Government.' The Board as contemplated in the bill is in no sense to be
an agency of the executive branch of the Government. It is to have a status
similiar to that of the Federal Trade Commission, which as the Supreme Court
pointed out in the Schecter case, is a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative body.
The conference agreement accepts this amendment." 79 CoNG. REC. 10298.
1 1-eari ns before Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1935)
"It [the Department of Labor] is charged with the function of promoting
the interest of the labor people. I think it would not be in accordance with
sound principle to have that kind of agency responsible in any way for the
work of a judicial body which has got to pass on controversies between
laboring people and their employers. I think it would be a vital error to put
this Board under the Labor Department, not because the Labor Department
would interfere with it but solely because of the impression on the public
and the effect which it would necessarily have by being placed under the
Department of Labor."
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stressed the importance of independence and impartiality
for the Board and suggested that the appointment of or
supervision over employees of the Board by the Depart-
ment of Labor would destroy such independence." ' Sen-
ator Wagner, discussing the Act at the hearings, suggested
that " . for the Department of Labor to have control of
the personnel carrying out quasi-judicial functions might
inject politics or political influences into a board that ought
to be free. 1.. Senator LaFollette and Chairman Biddle
also expressed the feeling that a practical supervision by
the Department of Labor over the Board would be impos-
sible." '  The President of the American Federation of
Labor and the Secretary of Labor both urged, however,
that the Board be placed in the Department of Labor "
Nevertheless, the Act as reported out by the Senate Com-
mittee and passed by the Senate provided for the creation
of an independent Board "4 the Act was reported favor-
ably by the House Committee after an amendment made
in committee that the Board should be "created in the
Department of Labor."''  Rep. Connery stated that "I
consulted with the President at the White House in refer-
1
"'Ibid., at 85, 86. "The value and success of any quasi-judicial Govern-
ment board dealing with labor relations lies, as the Secretary has stressed,
first and foremost in its independence and impartiality." Mr. Garrison con-
cludes that if the Secretary of Labor has budgetary power and the power to
appoint subordinates in the Board "the machinery cannot be considered either
impartial or independent."
' Ibid., at 115. Chairman Biddle also expressed a fear that Board admin-
istration might become too susceptible to purely political fluctuations if it were
not completely independent. Ibid., at 84.
' Ibid., at 87.
" Ibid., at 62, 63, 114. It has been suggested elsewhere that administrative
bodies should be placed under "the responsible political head of the appropriate
department," especially in rule making activities. Hart, Te Exercise of Rile
Making Power and the Preparation of Proposed Legislatwe Measures by Ad-
;mmistratize Dcpartnts, at 19-21 (1937).
' SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. & (1935).
"' Report supra, note 138S at 11; 79 CONG. REC. (9722).
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ence to this. After that conference I returned to my com-
mittee and reported its result, and the committee decided
to put the Board under the Department of Labor."'48 The
amendment was vigorously opposed by Representative
Marcantino, among others,"' and was rejected by a vote
of 48 to 130." ' The bill as originally introduced provided
at Section 12 for extensive arbitration of labor disputes
through machinery set up by the Act,' 9 and Senator
Wagner testified before the Senate Committee that it was
his desire to retain the Conciliation Service of the Depart-
ment of Labor in the National Labor Relations Board.'
However, the provision was ultimately withdrawn by com-
mittee amendment approved by the Senate.'51
The proposal to place the Board at least partially under
the direction of the Department of Labor, led to a consid-
eration at the hearings of the necessity for reposing policy
U 79 CoNG. REc. 9722.
Ibid., Rep. Marcantino cogently summarized the entire debate as follows:
". I should have thought that . . precedent alone would have induced
the establishment of the Board as an independent agency. The Board is to
be solely a quasi-judicial body with clearly defined and limited powers. Its
policies are marked out precisely by the law. That such an agency should be
free from any other executive branch of the Government has been the recog-
nized policy of Congress. . It seems strange that this Committee which has
built up so fine a record in the interests of labor, should be grudgingly unwilling
to establish for the protection of labor's most basic rights an agency as dignified
and independent, and as likely to attain the prestige that flows from the inde-
pendence, as those which have been established to protect the interests of other
groups."
"
8 Ibid., at 9725.
US Heanngs, mcpra, note 189 at 6.
20 Ibid., at 51.
S 79 CoNG. REc. 7652. Note Sen. Wagner's later statement regarding a
combination of prosecution and conciliation functions in one body: "The con-
fusion of the voluntarily submitted fair practice provisions with Section 7 (a)
has put the Recovery Administration in the untenable position of conciliator
and prosecutor at once. Not only has Section 7 (a) been lost in the shuffle
but the Recovery Administration itself has suffered from the misplaced burden."
79 CoNG. Ruc. 7568.
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making and enforcement powers in the same body It has
already been noted that the Department of Justice failed
to enforce the decisions of the old Boards operating under
Section 7 (a) and Public Resolution 44.1 Witnesses and
Congressmen disagreed as to whether the failure arose
from lack of personnel, lack of proper enforcement pro-
cedure, or disinterest in the cases transferred to it for
prosecution.' 3 Out of a consideration of the problems so
arising came the argument of Chairman Biddle that the
law raised economic, social, and legal problems; that a
specialized body was necessary to deal with them, that
with reference to the contents of Section 7 (a) "the lan-
guage of the section is broad and subtle measures of eva-
sion are countless," and finally, that "adequate enforce-
ment required agents who are sympathetic with the basic
purposes of Congress. 9'
1 4
The intent of Congress to create an administrative body
which would be free from what were thought to be pre-
dilections of the courts toward restricting the rights of
labor'" " was clearly revealed in the reports and debates
regarding the restriction of coercive practices of employees
as well as employers by the Act. The Senate report de-
scribed with some particularity the conduct which courts
had at times determined was coercive, including picketing,
threats to strike, closed-shop agreements, circularizing
banners or publications, and other like activities. To allow
the courts to determine these questions and enjoin or other-
wise prevent such activities under the cloak of preventing
"See supra, note 65.
'Hearings, vtpra, note 139 at 182 (H. A. Millis, now Chairman, National
Labor Relations Board), at 93 (Chairman Biddle); '79 CxG. Rc. 7569 (Sen.
Wagner); ibid., 9723 (Rep. Marcantino).
'Hearings, mtpra, note 139 at 94, 95, Cf., Landis, Symposin on Admss-
trative Law, (199) 9 Am. L. SCH. Rnv. 131, if.
"For a history of the approach of the English courts to the problem of
labor relations see LANDIS, CASES OF LABOR LAw (194) Chapter I.
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"coercion," it was argued, would be in effect to nullify
the Act itself, as well as the Norris-La Guardia Act de-
signed to prevent the use of the injunction in labor disputes
in the federal courts by the employers."" In the Senate
debates on the amendment proposed by Senator Tydings
to prohibit "coercion" by employees, the fear of allowing
the courts to engage in interpretation of the word "coer-
cion" was clear. Senator Barkley inquired of Senator
Couzens whether solicitation to join a union might not
be conceived by a court to be "coercion" ;... Senator Wag-
ner emphasized that the court had held that a threat to
strike was coercive and foresaw the emasculation of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act if the amendment were adopted.""
It remained for Senator Norris, however, to review the
anti-labor activities of the courts in detail, commenting
upon the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the general
approach of the courts in the past toward injunctive relief
for employers, including their interpretations of "coer-
cion," and emphasizing the dangers implicit in the pro-
posed amendment.' Whether rightly or wrongly, it seems
"Report, supra, note 144 at 16; see also, supra, note 65.
" "Assuming he and I were employed by the same employer or by different
employers as laboring men not belonging to any union, and somebody, either
from the inside or from the outside, came to him or me, or to both of us, to
persuade us to join a particular union by arguing with us that it was a better
union, or a more efficient or a more effective umon than some other union.
Would that be regarded as coercion or intimidation?" 79 CoNG. REC. 7656.
11Ibud., at 7657, 7670.
la" the Sherman Anti-trust Law became a weapon by which labor was
almost crushed out of existence because of the construction placed upon the law
by the courts. The Clayton Anti-trust Law did not do labor much
good. The constructions which were put on that law by the courts from time
to time practically took away all its force and effect.
"In the hearings [on the Norris-LaGuardia Act] which went on for three
years or so, during all of which I had the honor to preside, and in which I
heard every word of the testimony, the history of these injunction suits was
given, and the opinions of the courts were presented, showing that there was
a gradual movement toward the domination of capital over labor. The
historv of these injunctions shows that the general trend was to construe the
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clear that in matters relating to labor economics, the 74th
Congress agreed, in the words of Lord Erskine, that
"Even the noble judges are clothed beneath their ermine
with the common infirmities of man's nature."
The interpretation of the Act itself by the Board has
in general followed the suggestions enunciated during the
legislative process. A recent report of the Board recites
that
the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to provide
a legal channel through which labor disputes centering around the
right to organize and bargain collectively can be adjusted without
resort to strikes or other forms of economic action 10
Since Dr. William E. Lieserson was appointed to the
Board after the report was issued, his conception of the
Act may be referred to specially:
laws as capital wanted them to be construed. Suppose the pending amend-
ment were agreed to and some laboring man should meet some other laboring
man and say to him, 'I should like to have you join my union,' what would
there be to hinder one of the courts holding that that was coercion and issuing
an injunction in such a case? 'You may not coerce.' I would not think such
an act was coercion, the Senator from Maryland would not think it was
coercion, of course; we would not have agreed, either of us, with the construc-
tion placed by courts on the various acts that Congress has passed." 79 CoNG.
Rwc. 7669.
'"Turd Annual Report, National Labor Relations Board, p. 1 (1q.9).
See also, Madden, Letter to Senator Burke, quoted in Hearings before a sub-
committee of the committee on the judiciary on S. REc. 207, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1938) at 11, "Self-Government for Workers" speech delivered before
the American Political Science Association, December 29, 1938, 3 LRR Man.
l( S5, Radio Speech on January 29, 1939 over Mutual Broadcasting System,
3 L.R.R. Man. 1182; "The National Labor Relations Act, popularly known as
the Wagner Act, provides, in essence, for only three things. One is the liberty
of working people to join or form unions if they wish to, free from interference
by their employers. The second is the duty of employers to bargain collectively
with the representatives selected by a majority of their employees. The third
is the duty of the government, acting through the National Labor Relations
Board, to ascertain by an election or otherwise what union, if any, a majority
of the employees in a proper unit desire to represent them." To the same
effect, see Smith, The Labor Relations Act as Guardian of Dcrocracy. speech
before the Carolina Political Union, 2 LRR 1078 (1938).
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It [the Act] is intended to afford to employees the same right
of human association, the same freedom to associate with their
fellows for common benefit, that employers enjoy in their manufac-
turers' associations, chambers of commerce, and trade associations.'"
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in-
terpreting the scope, intent, and purpose of the Act closely
parallel the explanations-made by the Board. It has been
stated that the Act assumes that free opportunity for
collective bargaining with accredited representatives of
employees will promote industrial peace, and that the pur-
pose of the Act is
to protect interstate commerce by securing to employees the rights
established by Section 7 to organize, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for that and other purposes. 1 2
Emphasis has also been placed by the court upon the duty
of the Board to prohibit unfair labor practices and on its
right to investigate the conduct of the employers to ascer-
tain whether they have intimidated or coerced employees.'
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The history of legislation in the transportation indus-
try, beginning in 1888, slowed down by court decisions
from time to time during the development of a more chari-
table approach to the problems of labor by the courts and
the public, and culminating in the passage of the Railway
Labor Act in the years preceding the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, reveals the growing social consciousness of Con-
gress regarding modern industrial problems. The hard-
headed economic approach to labor difficulties on a quid
1 House Hearings at 3.
'aNational Labor Relations Bd. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
303 U. S. 261, 265, 266 (1938).
"6 Cf., The Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Bd,, 301 U. S.
103, 129.
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pro quo basis in the Recovery Act wherein labor and capi-
tal agreed to share the benefits and the burdens of the
plan proposed to stimulate business activities also displayed
a conviction that at least a part of the remedy for our
economic illnesses lay in established employer-employee re-
lationships achieved through employer acceptance of the
desirability of collective bargaining. More significant still
was the conclusion of Congress that Section 7 (a) of the
Recovery Act had failed, along with Public Resolution 44,
which sought to implement it, because of delays in the
enforcement of Board orders, delays in holding elections,
ambiguity of the statutes, the rise of company unions,
diffusion of administrative responsibility, and the lack of
existing powers for investigation and enforcement vested
in the Board. In the Recovery Act and Public Resolution
44, implementary powers of the Board were lacking, un-
doubtedly due in part to a general reluctance to invest the
Board with discretionary powers for enforcement. And
the necessity for such implementation was freely conceded
during the debates on the Act, which itself embodied pro-
visions rectifying many of the conditions causing the
breakdown of Section 7 (a). The indignation against
company unions, a consideration of the methods neces-
sarily used in combating them, and the approval of the
provisions leaving the closed shop problem to be dealt with
by the states, all indicate an understanding of the extremely
wide-spread regulatory activities to be performed by the
Board. The extent of Congressional awareness of the
.cope of the Act is also shown by the rejection of amend-
nients which directed the attention of Congress to every
controversial part of the provisions of the Act and exten-
sive debates concerning the partiality of the Act toward
the employee, in which it was agreed that the purpose of
the \ct was to promote equality of bargaining power be-
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tween employer and employee by assisting the employee
while refraining from giving aid to the employer. The
entire record of the hearings, reports, and debates indicates
the promulgation of legislation to translate into action
Congressional conviction on a political and economic prob-
lem of tremendous proportions, the difficulties in the exe-
cution of which were well recognized by those enacting
the legislation. It may be assumed that the agency admin-
istering the legislation was expected to have and exercise
powers to implement the Act coextensive with the duties
therein imposed.
The legislative history of the procedural provisions of
the Act and the Congressional conception of the general
nature of the agency adds weight to the finding that the
power of enforcement intended to be conferred on the
Board was extremely wide in scope. The concept of the
Board as analogous to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and the Federal Trade Commission, with their wide
powers for adaptation of the statutes to multifarious activ-
ities in the regulation of transportation industry and un-
fair trade practices, emphasized the scope of procedural
adaptation to the changing problems of labor relations
implicitly and explicitly extended by the Act. On the other
hand, there were constant references to the Board as a
"quasi-judicial" agency. What the legislators meant by
"quasi-judicial" is doubtful, but it is clear that traditional
judicial characteristics were not considered the sine qua
non of adjudicative excellence; for the courts themselves
were severely criticized in the course of the debates.
THE WAGNER ACT AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
No one living in America in 1935 needs be reminded
that during the period when the National Labor Relations
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Act was passed, the country was still slowly emerging
from the economic chaos of the preceding five years. Rolls
of the Works Progress Administration were crowded,
millions of other employables were employed only part
time, and unemployment was still the major economic
problem of the country. The labor market was, in a word,
glutted. The unfair labor practices of employers during
the half decade before the Act had been unrestricted by
labor principally because of intensive competition among
many workmen for a few jobs. In such a labor economy.
it seemed manifest that economics and ethics alike dictated
an attempt to equalize the bargaining power of capital and
labor Nowhere in the debates do the rights of consumer,
or of the public generally, appear to have been considered
except as to the general public interest in stimulating eco-
nomic recovery through relieving the public of the burden
of labor disputes-a factor which, in view of the extensive
discussion concerning the constitutionality of the statute,
may have been presented by the proponents of the Act
principally with a view to establishing the "burden on
interstate commerce" theory upon which the constitution-
ality of the Act was ultimately rested.
Our present economy, predicated principally upon a
scarcity of labor, raises a question as to how far the Act
was intended to cover labor problems currently arising
The problems to be met are not altogether the same as those
of 1935, although basically the problems in each type of
labor economy are to prevent work stoppages and insure
fair dealing. Certainly the emphasis in the administration
of such legislation must change, for in times of labor scar-
city the worker is much closer to equality of bargaining
power with the employer than in periods of labor plenitude.
Certainly, also, the stake of the public in the speedy and
equitable settlement of labor disputes has grown immea-
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surably with our entrance into armed conflict.
Specific aspects of the aims of the Act ought to be
examined in the light of those changes in national economy
A principal problem which has arisen in the recent months
relates to the need for mediation of labor disputes. As has
already been noted, bills have been introduced into Con-
gress to require mediation 6 s of such controversies and the
rising tide of labor disputes prompted the President to
appoint a special mediation committee by executive order
on March 21st last. " 6
Will the legislative process justify an extension of
See note 4, supra.
't 6 FFD. REG. 1532, 1533 (No. 56) March 21, 1941. The order created a
board to be known as The National Defense Mediation Board of eleven mem-
bers representing employers, employees and the public. The Board is to act
upon application of the Department of Labor after its conciliation efforts have
failed to adjust the dispute. No sanctions are given the Board except the right
to take testimony and publish findings and recommendations concerning disputes.
The proclamation also states that parties to labor disputes should give the
Board and the Department of Labor notice of demands m such matters, full
information as to developments, and advance notice of "threatened interruptions
to continuous production."
Under a regulation of the Office of Production Management, a Labor Di-
vision was established on March 18, 1941, the duties of the Director of which
were to ascertain labor requirements for national defense, develop programs
and coordinate efforts for assuring an adequate labor supply for national de-
fense and advise with employers regarding standards of work and employment,
and "assist in the prevention and adjustment of any labor controversies which
might retard the defense program " 0. P M. Regulation No. 5, Mar. 18,
1941, 9 U. S. L. WEaK 2575 (1941).
Public sentiment as to mediation shown by the Gallup polls at the time of
the appointment of the commission indicated that 85% of the people would re-
quire employers and employees to mediate their differences. See Gallup polls
released March 26, 1941 and March 30, 1941. In a later survey by the same
group, a cross section of voters was asked. "When workers in a factory
working on defense contracts vote to go on strike, do you think they should
be required by law to wait for sixty days before the strike can start?" Fewer
than one voter in twelve had no opinion on the subject; eighty-nine percent
favored the proposal and eleven percent disapproved. Among industrial labor
union members more than two-thirds approved such a cooling off period. N. Y.
Times, May 2, 1941, 20:3.
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Board activities into the field of conciliation? The report
of the House Committee on the adoption of the Act after
reciting the quasi-judicial powers of the Board,'" related
This of course does not preclude securing compliance, either by a
stipulation procedure or otherwise, prior to formal hearing or appli-
cation to the courts. But the Board and its agents or agencies are
required to carry out the declared will of Congress as provided in
this definite legislation, the law must have application in all cases,
and must not be haggled about or compromised because of exigency
of a particular situation or the weakness of a particular employee
group as against a more powerful employer. Under the bill it is
contemplated that the Board, its agents or agencies will not confuse
the quasi-judicial nature of their function by intruding upon the
regular work of the Conciliation Service of the Department of
L abor.' "
While the Board has in fact settled many of the charges
of unfair labor practices brought to its attention,' the
jurisdiction to prevent these practices is such that normally
there has been no occasion for it to attempt to settle a
dispute as it is in progress, the jurisdiction of the Board
being limited under the Act to finding whether an em-
ployer has engaged in unfair labor practices, and to ascer-
taining the appropriate bargaining agency designated by
the employees. It has already been noted that the bill
originally provided machinery for extensive arbitration
of labor disputes, and that it was originally planned to
retain the Conciliation Service of the Department of
Labor in the Board. 7" The fact that these provisions were
eliminated from the bill before its final passage"' illustrates
"" See text to note, 138, supra.
luSupra, note 138.
' Out of 22,89 cases disposed of by the Board between October 1, 1933,
and June 30, 1939, 48 per cent were settled, 13.5 per cent were dismissed by
the regional director for the Board, and 24.3 percent were withdrawn after con-
ference with Board Officials. 2 House Hearings 375, Exh. 40.
17'Supra, notes 140-150, and text.
" Supra, note 151 and text.
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clearly that in the field of general conciliation, at least
where unconnected with a prosecution for unfair labor
practices, the Board can have no place in labor disputes
in defense industries.7 2
A constant irritant of public opinion relating to labor
now as at all times has been the jurisdictional strike. When
the public safety is imperiled, stoppages of production
pending determination, not of whether the employees are
to belong to a union, but as to which union shall represent
the employees of a particular employer, incur increasing
disapproval of the public." 3 In this field, prompt and effec-
tive action by the Board in designating a bargaining
agency under the Act may result in eliminating causes of
friction prior to suspension of production, for the Board
is particularly charged with the duty of determining ap-
propriate bargaining agencies and units by Section 9 of
the Act. It seems reasonable to believe that the Board
will endeavor to give jurisdictional disputes in defense
industries preferential places on its dockets. The Presi-
dent, however, in an Executive Order 4 moved to insure
that this be done by extending power to the National De-
fense Mediation Board "to request the National Labor
Relations Board, in any controversy or dispute relating to
1 See, also Section 10 (b) of the Act, which apparently grants jurisdic-
tion to the Board to intervene in a labor dispute not involving representation
of employees only " whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in
or is engaging in any such unfair practices", which apparently restricts the
jurisdiction of the Board only to matters wherein a charge has been filed.
' Although the subject has not specifically been made the occasion for a
survey, it cannot be doubted that jurisdictional strikes have had much to do
with the sentiment shown in the Gallup polls wherein 72% of those responding
to inquiries on the subject stated that they would approve forbidding strikes in
the defense industries, (See Gallup polls released on March 26, 1941, and
March 30, 1941) and one-third of the union members questioned regarding the
lag in defense industries voluntarily mentioned strikes and failure of labor
unions to cooperate.
' Supra, note 166, at Section 2 (e).
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the appropriate unit or appropriate representatives to be
designated for purposes of collective bargaining, to ex-
pedite as much as possible the determination of the appro-
priate unit ." In the absence of discussion of this
matter in the legislative process, it seems clear that the
Presidential suggestion is in conformity with the general
spirit and scope of the Act.
With the public attitude toward the need for acceler-
ated preparation for national defense rapidly approaching
the "Work or Fight" degree of intensity," public reaction
against production delays due to labor difficulties in defense
industries1" presents the question of what sanctions, if
any, can be invoked by existing governmental agencies
against labor to insure the uninterrupted production of
defense materials. The history of the Act makes it clear
that it was never intended that the Act should impose any
responsibilities upon employees with reference to their re-
lationships with employers, excepting perhaps the duty to
affiliate with a majority group where a closed-shop con-
tract had been executed. Particularly was it indicated in
S'cction 13 of the Act that "Nothing in this Act shall be
(,,nstrued so as to interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike." When, during a discussion
,,f the bill on the floor of the Senate, it was suggested that
the bill ought to be amended to make it obligatory on the
members of the unions to fulfill the conditions of a contract
entered into by them with the management, it was replied
by proponents of the bill that to so amend the bill would
" "Work or Fight" became a watchword during the First World War.
See Selective Service Regulations Sec. 121A-L, (1918) the effect of which
is discussed generally in Hoague, Brown and Marcus, Wartime Conscription
and Control of Labor (1940) 54 HAR. L. Rxv. 50, at 58-59 and NATIONAL
WAR LA 0 BOARD (Bull, No. 387, Bur. Lab. Stat., U. S. Dept. Lab.), 34,
if, dealing with general enforcement of "Work or Fight" requirements. For
present developments in this direction see notes 187 if. mifra. and text.
. Cf., e. g., notes 173 and 166, supra.
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be to establish a virtual "slavery" of the employees. Upon
such a response, the amendment was defeated.' Such a
legislative history reflects no theory in the legislative proc-
ess whereby Board orders might require employees to
remain at their positions.
Moreover, coercion of employees by other employees in
defense industries, either apart from or in connection with
strikes, may ultimately become a subject of vital public
concern. Here, also, it seems clear from the legislative
history of the Act that the Board may exercise no jurisdic-
tion over such problems. The discussion of the matter in
the Senate hearings"7 8 and the Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on the bill,' as well as the debates on the floor of
the Senate,8 ' reveal a considered determination to place
coercion by employees beyond the scope of the regulatory
powers of the Board.
Employees, as well as employers and the general public.
have rights which ought to be safeguarded in the months
to come. It has been suggested that "labor peace, and the
resultant steady flow of production, can best be achieved
through fair dealing-not repressive legislation..''. Cer-
tainly there can be no quarrel with such a conclusion. But
what is "fair dealing", and what part ought the Board
play in ensuring it? During the early stages of the defense
program, the Board called the attention of the Army and
Navy officials having charge of placing orders for defense
materials to the fact that certain industrial organizations
had been accused and found guilty of unfair labor practices
" 79 CoaG. REC. 9730.
"'Supra, note 99 and text.
" Supra, note 100 and text.
16 Supra, notes 1f1-106 and text.
Pressman, Sabotage and National Defense, (1941) 54 HAR. L. REv. 632,
644. See also LABOR AND NATIoNAL DEFENSE, op. cit. spra, note 2, at 118,
122 ff.
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by the Board. After contradictory announcements by offi-
cials of the Army and the Navy and a somewhat equivocal
opinion by Attorney General Jackson, the Assistant Sec-
retary of War issued to contracting officers a statement of
the labor policy of the War Department informing them
that although compliance with the Act would be a factor
in considering the ability of a contractor to carry out his
contract,
The award of a War Department contract is not to be con-
sidered as barred by the single fact that proceedings under the
National Labor Relations Act have been instituted or that findings
uf violations of the Act have been made by the National Labor
Relations Boardlu2
Thereafter, the Army and Navy officials inserted a
clause into agreements with contractors setting forth the
statement of the Commission concerning labor policy ap-
proved by the President as a guide to letting such con-
tracts. This was done by means of Procurement Circular
43. Even this order was rescinded on June 5, 1941, how-
ever, by Procurement Circular 40."'
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act is there
any suggestion that the Board should solicit the coopera-
tion of other branches of the Government in applying sanc-
tions for violation of the Act by withholding government
contracts, and the memorandum above incisively demon-
strates the disapproval of the War Department of the
application of such sanctions. It seems possible, at least,
that the conclusion of the Assistant Secretary might have
been different had there been any evidence of a legislative
12 Q. M. G. Circular letter No. 104, Nov. 28, 1940; 9 U. S. L. WEEK 2357
(Dec. 24, 1940). For a history of the discussion of the legal and political con-
siderations involved in awarding defense contracts to those accused of violations
of the National Labor Relations Act, see also 9 U. S. L. WEEK 2217 (October
S. 194()) and 2230 (October 15, 1940).
" 9 U. S. L. WEEK, 2160, 2347 and 2750 (1940-1941).
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intent to authorize the imposition of such a penalty by the
Board. However, in view of the very broad general powers
granted the President to require the cooperation of indus-
trial leaders in national defense matters through the so-
called "lease-lend" bill, " there seems to be no present need
to seek for additional techniques through which employers
may be required to cooperate-in labor disputes or other
matters-for the furtherance of the defense program.
This is, of course, particularly true in view of the broad
powers granted to the President in time of war as Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
The method of approach to the first real labor crisis
in national defense preparations indicates the probable
procedures to be followed in the future, and emphasizes
that imperative necessity for the production of defense
materials may elicit governmental intervention in labor
disputes of a distinctly different nature from that author-
ized in the Act. The controversy is tersely described in
an executive order by the President, issued during the
dispute, which set forth in substance that The North
American Aviation, Inc., at its Inglewood plant in Los
Angeles, California, had contracts with the United States
for the manufacture of military aircraft, that a contro-
versy arose at the plant over terms and conditions of em-
ployment between the company and the workers which they
were unable to adjust by collective bargaining; that the
matter was referred to the National Defense Mediation
Board, and that notwithstanding an agreement between
the Mediation Board and the representatives of the em-
ployees to resume operations, the strike continued, causing
cessation of production of aircraft. 8 ' Serious difficulties
'Public Law 11, H. R. 1776, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Approved March 11,
1941.
' Executive Order No. 8773, June 9, 1941, 6 Fms. REc. 3109 (1941), 9
U. S. L. WE=K 2750 (1941).
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were exzperienced during the latter part of May, and more
particularly during the first few days of June. During this
period, varied pressures were brought to bear on the re-
calcitrant employees and their supporters. On May 28,
1941, the regulations of the Selective Service Administra-
tion were amended so as to provide more broadly for the
reclassification of all registrants,1" amending and combin-
ing Section XXX and Paragraph 333 of Volume 3 of the
:elective Service Regulations. The amendments related to
all individuals deferred, and placed renewed emphasis on
the fact that deferments (including those made for persons
engaged in defense industries) were merely temporary and
subject to change by the various draft boards. In view
of the general application of the amendment, the connec-
tion with the North American dispute is only speculative.
COn June 5, 1941, however, a more direct announcement
was made by the Secretary of War to the effect that
boldiers who had held key positions in defense industries
before induction, whose services were requested by their
ruespcctive employers, might be released to re-enter their
previous employments. '  The decision rendered many
skilled workers at least potentially available to relieve the
labor scarcity which might be expected to result from pos-
sible widespread extension of the area of employer-
employee conflicts. On the same day, the Army and Navy
Officials withdrew the provisions in contracts which had
indirectly discouraged unfair labor practices on the part
Of employers. ' The strike continued in unabated inten-
sity, and on June 9, 1941, two steps of far reaching signifi-
cance in war labor economics took place. On that date
state directors of the Selective Service System were re-
o6 FED. REG. 2603 (1941).
11 U. S. L. WEEK, 2750 (1941).
See note 183, supra, and text.
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quested to reclassify employees in defense industries who
had terminated the employments under which they had
received deferred status, 8 ' and the President issued an
executive order directing the Secretary of War to take
over the plant, directing also that workers returning to
the plant for employment were to be protected, and author-
izing the Secretary to employ civilians in his discretion.
Possession and operation under the order were to be ter-
minated as soon as the President determined that the plant
would be privately operated in a manner consistent with
the needs of national defense.' Production was resumed
in due course, and on July 2, 1941, under another executive
order, possession of the plant was relinquished."'
Hence it appears that procedures other than those
established by the Act are presently favored in the solution
of those difficulties peculiar to our present necessities in
promoting production for national defense purposes, both
as to preliminary negotiations now handled by various
The instructions provided as follows "The basic principle upon which
selective service operates is to keep the man on the job where he can render
the greatest service to his government. The citizen who has been deferred be-
cause of the job he is performing in the national defense program cannot expect
to retain the status of deferment when he ceases to work on the job for which
he was deferred. The status of deferment and the responsibility to perform
the necessary work are inseparable.
"Therefore, I hereby direct all agencies of the Selective Service System to
take the necessary action to reconsider the classification of all registrants who
have ceased to perform the jobs for which they were deferred, and who are,
by such failure, impeding the national defense program." Instructions of Act-
ing Director to State Directors, June 9, 1941, quoted from 9 U. S. L. ,VWxx,
2750 (1941).
' Cited supra, note 185.
16 FED. REG. 3253 (1941). The practice has also been followed subse-
quently. See -Executive order No. 8868 Aug. 23, 1941, in connection with the
Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. (Kearney, N. J.), (10 U. S. L. Week
2127 (1941)), Executive Order 8928, Oct. 30, 1941, Air Associates, Inc., (Ben-
dix, N. J.), (ibid., at 2a74).
THE WAGNER ACT
committees mentioned, and as to ultimate removal of
stoppages in production caused by labor disputes.
It further appears that neither the legislative history
of the Act nor present sanctions in labor disputes in de-
fense industries furnish a foundation upon which it can be
said that the Act is, or was intended to be, adaptable to
a war time economy. Quite possibly it is true, as Repre-
sentative Murdock has said, that "the scheme of the Act
should be supported by even greater sanctions than it
carries at the present time," '192 even though it may be
doubted that the public welfare would be served by "the
enactment of legislation, adding criminal penalties for vio-
lation of the NLRA," as suggested by the General Counsel
for the Congress of Industrial Organizations."' In any
event, it is clear that no present widening of the scope of
the authority of the Board to enforce penalties against
recalcitrant employers, either by a denial of government
contracts in defense matters, or otherwise, can be predi-
cated upon the legislative history of the Act. It is equally
clear that there has never been an indication in the legisla-
tive process that the provisions of the Act might be invoked
to police in any manner the conduct of employees in their
relationships with the employer or other employees, to
disaffirm the right to strike, or to require mediation or
arbitration of labor disputes.
12 Murdock, The Defense Emergency and the Nattonal Labor Relations Act.
(1940). 3 NAT. LAW. G. Q. 87, 90.
' See supra, note 181, at 645.
